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Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance:
Privacy in the Digital Age
Marko Milanovic*
Introduction
The 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden of the scope and magnitude of
electronic surveillance programs run by the U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA) and some of its partners, chief among them the UK Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), have provoked intense public de-
bate regarding the proper limits of such intelligence activities. Privacy ac-
tivists decry such programs, especially those involving the mass collection of
the data or communications of ordinary individuals across the globe, argu-
ing that they create an inhibiting surveillance climate that diminishes basic
freedoms, while government officials justify them as necessary to prevent
terrorism. Snowden’s disclosures proved especially damaging for U.S. for-
eign policy interests when it was revealed that the United States and some of
its “Five Eyes” partners1 spied on the leaders of allied governments, includ-
ing Germany, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia.2
* Associate Professor, University of Nottingham School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of
Michigan Law School, Fall 2013; Secretary-General, European Society of International Law. E-mail:
marko.milanovic@nottingham.ac.uk. I am grateful for their most helpful comments to Gerry Neuman,
Peter Margulies, the participants of the Roundtable on Protecting Human Rights in the Age of Surveil-
lance, organized by the Center for Democracy and Technology and the American University Washington
College of Law in January 2014, and the participants of the seminar on the Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age organized at the United Nations headquarters in Geneva in February 2014. This is a fast-
moving topic, and the article takes into account developments as of March 2014. This article incorpo-
rates much of the text of a blog series I wrote on the topic from November 25–29, 2013 on EJIL: Talk!
at http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-rights-introduction/, but in a revised and
more developed form.
1. The “Five Eyes” is an alliance of five English-speaking countries—the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, focusing mainly on cooperating in the domain of signals
intelligence. See generally Carly Nyst, The Five Eyes Fact Sheet, Privacy Int’l (Nov. 26, 2013), https://
www.privacyinternational.org/blog/the-five-eyes-fact-sheet; Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes—Explainer,
The Guardian (Dec. 2, 2013, 12:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-
5-eyes-explainer.
2. See Jacob Appelbaum et al., Berlin Complains: Did U.S. Tap Chancellor Merkel’s Mobile Phone?, Spie-
gel Online (Oct. 23, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/merkel-calls-obama-
over-suspicions-us-tapped-her-mobile-phone-a-929642.html; Brazil and Mexico Probe Claims U.S. Spied on
Presidents, BBC News (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23938909; Ewen
MacAskill & Lenore Taylor, Australia’s Spy Agencies Targeted Indonesian President’s Mobile Phone, The
Guardian (Nov. 17, 2013, 7:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-
to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone.
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The political fallout of the Snowden disclosures has undoubtedly been
very significant. They revealed the sheer technological capacity of the NSA
and other signals intelligence agencies to collect personal data on a vast scale
and to subvert and intercept communication over the Internet. The public
scrutiny of the work of these agencies has been unprecedented, and discus-
sions are ongoing in government and policy circles on how to regulate and
reform such activities. Thus, for instance, President Obama appointed a Re-
view Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies to advise
him on possible options for reform, which the Review Group did in an
extensive report.3 The President responded with a series of reform propos-
als.4 The U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, and other legislative bod-
ies have held or will be holding committee hearings on the various mass
data collection programs.
The purpose of this article, however, is not to assess the general propriety
or usefulness of surveillance programs, or their compliance with relevant
domestic law. I will not argue that electronic surveillance programs,
whether targeted or done on mass scale, are per se illegal, ineffective, or un-
justifiable. Rather, I will look at how the legality of such programs would
be debated and assessed within the framework of international human rights
law, specifically under the major human rights treaties to which the “Five
Eyes” and other states with sophisticated technological capabilities, such as
Germany, France, and Russia, are parties: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR).5 Both of these treaties protect the right to privacy.
Drawing almost verbatim on Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR),6 Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that
3. The President’s Review Grp. on Intelligence & Comm’ns Techs., Office of the Dir. of
Nat’l Intelligence, Liberty and Security in a Changing World (2013), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter Review Group
Report].
4. See infra notes 55–56 and relevant text.
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102–23,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). Australia ratified the ICCPR on August 13,1980; Canada on May 19,
1976; France on November 4, 1980; New Zealand on December 28, 1978; Russia on October 16, 1973;
the United Kingdom on May 20, 1976; the United States on June 8, 1992. China signed the ICCPR on
October 5, 1998 but has not yet become a party. See United Nations, Status of International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en. The U.K., France, and Russia are also
parties to the ECHR and subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
See Council of Europe, Status of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Council of Eur. Treaty Off., available at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=08/02/2014&CL=ENG.
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948).
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1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
Article 8 of the ECHR, on the other hand, stipulates that
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
These provisions are broad and vague.7 They are also coupled with the pre-
liminary threshold question of whether they would apply at all to extraterri-
torial surveillance. But while there are many uncertainties regarding the
application of human rights treaties to intelligence gathering, these ques-
tions are not insurmountable. Indeed, it is inevitable that human rights lan-
guage and fora will be used to challenge the legality of electronic
surveillance programs, as is already being done by privacy activists.8 Special
rapporteurs of the U.N. Human Rights Council have already started exam-
ining the impact of counter-terrorism measures on the right to privacy.9
7. Similarly, Article V of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides that
“[e]very person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his
reputation, and his private and family life.” American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in
the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 17. American Convention on Human
Rights art. 11, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 is modelled on the text of the UDHR/ICCPR, while
also incorporating some of the language of Article V of the American Declaration. The Organization of
African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), adopted on June 27,
1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3630.html,
does not explicitly protect the right to privacy.
8. See International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, Neces-
sary & Proportionate (May 2014), https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text (a set of 13 princi-
ples drawn from human rights law that would apply to both domestic and extraterritorial surveillance,
drafted by numerous civil society organizations in a comprehensive process led by Privacy International,
Access, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
9. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terror-
ism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin Scheinin); Special Rapporteur on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/46 (May 17,
2010) (by Martin Scheinin); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Free-
dom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (by Frank La Rue).
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Litigation already is or soon will be pending, either before domestic courts
in states where human rights treaties are directly applicable, or before inter-
national judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Some of these cases are likely to
proceed to an examination of the merits, particularly in Europe, where
standing, state secrets and political question doctrines are either non-exis-
tent or are not as onerous for applicants to overcome as they are in the
United States.10 GCHQ has long been aware that, if exposed, its mass sur-
veillance programs may be subject to “damaging public debate” and legal
challenge on privacy grounds under the ECHR.11 Indeed, one case before the
European Court of Human Rights dealing with GCHQ interception of ex-
ternal communications has already been communicated to the U.K. govern-
ment, with the Court moving at an almost unprecedented speed in dealing
with the case.12
Crucially, human rights language has also been used at a purely inter-
governmental level. Prompted by allegations of U.S. spying on their leaders,
in October 2013 Brazil and Germany submitted a draft resolution entitled
“The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age” to the Third Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”).13 After pushback by the
United States and its “Five Eyes” allies and the usual diplomatic wrangling
(much of it based on arguments that the right to privacy does not apply
extraterritorially)14 the draft underwent revision, obtained more sponsors,
and cleared the Third Committee;15 it was adopted without a vote by the
Assembly itself a few weeks later.16 The revisions were mainly stylistic, ton-
ing down, for example, some of the more emphatic references to violations of
10. Compare Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding by 5 votes to 4 that a real
likelihood that individuals would be subjected to surveillance measures, rather than proof that such
measures were actually taken, was not sufficient for standing, which could not be speculative) with Klass
v. Germany (Judgment), App. No. 5029/71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-73538 (allowing for precisely this kind of speculative
standing).
11. See James Ball, Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to Keep Mass Surveillance Secret, The Guardian
(Oct. 25, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-
mass-surveillance-secret-snowden.
12. Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (Communicated Case), App. No. 58170/13, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2013). Similarly, a domestic U.K. case was filed before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal by
Privacy International. See Privacy International Files Legal Challenge Against UK Government Over Mass Sur-
veillance Programmes, Privacy Int’l (July 8, 2013), https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/
privacy-international-files-legal-challenge-against-uk-government-over-mass.
13. Colum Lynch et al., Exclusive: Germany, Brazil Turn to U.N. to Restrain American Spies, Foreign
Policy (Oct. 24, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/24/exclusive_
germany_brazil_turn_to_un_to_restrain_american_spies. United Nations General Assembly, Third
Comm., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/68/L.45 (Nov. 1, 2013).
14. Colum Lynch, Exclusive: Inside America’s Plan to Kill Online Privacy Rights Everywhere, Foreign
Policy (Nov. 20, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_
americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere.
15. United Nations General Assembly, Third Comm., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/68/L.45/Rev.1 (Nov. 1, 2013).
16. Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, G.A. Res 68/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/
167 (Jan. 21, 2014).
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or attacks against privacy. But together with the caveats they expressed in
the Third Committee, the revisions allowed the resolution to be sufficiently
acceptable to the United States and its closest allies.17
On any assessment, the Assembly’s resolution on the right to privacy in
the digital age represents a major development. It firmly puts the issue of
electronic surveillance within the framework of international human rights
law and directly invokes both Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the
ICCPR. In the preamble, the Assembly expresses its deep concern “at the
negative impact that surveillance and/or interception of communications,
including extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception of communications, as well
as the collection of personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass
scale, may have on the exercise and enjoyment of human rights.”18  Opera-
tive paragraph three affirms “that the same rights that people have offline
must also be protected online, including the right to privacy,” while opera-
tive paragraph four calls upon states “to respect and protect the right to
privacy, including in the context of digital communication”—the reference
to the obligation to protect being especially significant since it requires
states to regulate the conduct of non-state actors, such as telecommunica-
tions companies.19
But the most important aspect of the resolution is that it initiates a pro-
cess, a conversation, on the application of human rights norms to surveil-
lance, interception, and data collection activities, even when such activities
are conducted by a state outside its borders. Operative paragraph five of the
resolution states:
Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights to present a report on the protection and promotion of the
17. The U.S. representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, Elizabeth Cousens, explained
U.S. support for the revised draft by saying that that the United States understands “this resolution to be
focused on State action and consistent with longstanding U.S. views regarding the ICCPR, including
Articles 2, 17, and 19.” This appropriately subtle diplomatic reference to longstanding U.S. views re-
garding Article 2 ICCPR allowed the U.S. to seemingly join the consensus on protecting the right to
privacy in a digital age while in fact denying that the right to privacy as protected by the ICCPR applies
extraterritorially. I will be examining this position in more detail in Part II below. For the full text of
Ambassador Cousens’ remarks, see Ambassador Elizabeth Cousens, U.S. Rep. to the U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council, Explanation of Position for the Third Committee Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age (Nov. 26, 2013), http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/218078.htm.
18. G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 16 (emphasis added).
19. Id. Op. para. 4 also calls upon states
(b) To take measures to put an end to violations of those rights and to create the conditions to prevent
such violations, including by ensuring that relevant national legislation complies with their obligations
under international human rights law;
(c) To review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of communications,
their interception and collection of personal data, including mass surveillance, interception and collec-
tion, with a view to upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation of
all their obligations under international human rights law;
(d) To establish or maintain existing independent, effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of
ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for State surveillance of communications, their
interception and collection of personal data.
86 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
right to privacy in the context of domestic and extraterritorial
surveillance and/or interception of digital communications and
collection of personal data, including on a mass scale, to the
Human Rights Council at its twenty-seventh session and to the
General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, with views and rec-
ommendations, to be considered by Member States.
Numerous meetings, expert seminars, and similar events will of course in-
form the report, although the report itself will not be the end of the story.
Electronic surveillance and related activities will remain on the agenda of
U.N. bodies for years to come, especially since the political relevance of the
topic shows no signs of abating. The discussion has just started, and it will
continue at least partly in human rights terms, focusing on the rights and
interests of the affected individuals, rather than solely on the interests and
sovereignty of states.20 It is because of their equal, inherent human dignity
that all individuals are deserving of some protection for their privacy, not
simply because two states made reciprocal arrangements not to spy on each
other’s citizens.
The primary purpose of this article is to advance this conversation by
looking at one specific, threshold issue: whether human rights treaties such
as the ICCPR and the ECHR even apply to foreign surveillance. I will use
the term “foreign surveillance” loosely, as an umbrella term encompassing a
wide range of activities conducted for the purpose of gathering intelligence,
ranging from audio-visual observation or surveillance in a narrower sense, to
the interception of communications, electronic and otherwise, to the collec-
tion, storage, processing, and transfer of personal data to third parties. Note
also how the term foreign surveillance or intelligence can be understood in at
least three different ways: as activities undertaken by a state that are directed
against individuals who are officials, members or agents of foreign governments
or organizations; as activities targeted against individuals who are foreign na-
tionals; or as activities targeted against individuals who are located outside the
state territory, who may or may not be its nationals.21 We will see throughout
the article how these three elements—agency, nationality, and location—
frequently interact with one another in the regulation of surveillance activi-
ties. As states increasingly engage in mass extraterritorial surveillance,22
20. Consider, for example, the arbitral proceedings filed by Timor-Leste against Australia, which
involve allegations of Australian espionage during treaty negotiations between the two states, as well as a
related case filed afterwards before the ICJ. See Kate Mitchell & Dapo Akande, Espionage & Good Faith in
Treaty Negotiations: East Timor v Australia, EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/espionage-
fraud-good-faith-in-treaty-negotiations-east-timor-v-australia-in-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/.
21. Consider, for example, the definition of foreign intelligence in Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R.
§ 3.5(d) (1981), which demarcates the responsibilities of various U.S. intelligence agencies, as “informa-
tion relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers organizations or persons, but
not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.”
22. See La Rue Report, supra note 9, para. 64 (noting that “a number of States have begun to adopt
laws that purport to authorize them to conduct extra-territorial surveillance or to intercept communica-
tions in foreign jurisdictions. This raises serious concern with regard to the extra-territorial commission
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clarifying the threshold question of applicability, as this article attempts to
do, is a necessary first step in any human rights analysis of the topic.
  The article proceeds in five parts. Part I looks briefly at whether citizen-
ship should be the normative basis for fundamental rights, including the
right to privacy. Part II interprets the text of the clauses of human rights
treaties that define their territorial scope of application. It compares the
jurisdiction clauses of the ECHR and the ICCPR, and critically evaluates the
U.S. position on the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. Part III ex-
amines the main strands of the case law of international human rights bodies
with respect to the treaties’ extraterritorial application, which conceptualize
state jurisdiction in human rights treaties either as effective overall control
of territories or areas, or as authority and control over individuals. Part IV
will apply the different models of jurisdiction to a number of possible fac-
tual scenarios of foreign or extraterritorial surveillance. Finally, while the
focus of this article is on the threshold question of applicability, that ques-
tion is in practice inseparable from a substantive analysis on the merits. Part
V will thus look at what the right to privacy might substantively entail in
the extraterritorial context, if it is indeed found to apply.
The article will show that there is much uncertainty as to how existing
case law on the jurisdictional threshold issues might apply to foreign sur-
veillance. It will also argue that this uncertainty should not be overesti-
mated—even if the uncertainty can and is being exploited. We will see how
the inherent instability of the spatial and personal models of state jurisdic-
tion in human rights treaties is the product of a balance between considera-
tions of universality and effectiveness. The only truly coherent approach to
the threshold question of applicability, I will argue, is that human rights
treaties should apply to virtually all foreign surveillance activities. That the
treaties apply to such activities, however, does not mean that such activities
are necessarily unlawful. Rather, the lawfulness of a foreign surveillance pro-
gram is subject to a fact-specific examination on the merits of its compliance
with the right to privacy, and in that, I submit, foreign surveillance activi-
ties are no different from purely domestic ones.
I. Do Foreigners Deserve Privacy?
A. Citizenship and the Social Contract
Before looking at the ICCPR and the ECHR in detail, it is necessary to
briefly deal with a prior question—who deserves privacy? One robust fea-
ture of U.S. discourse, for example, is a continuing emphasis on citizenship as
of human rights violations and the inability of individuals to know that they might be subject to foreign
surveillance, challenge decisions with respect to foreign surveillance, or seek remedies. . . . These devel-
opments suggest an alarming trend towards the extension of surveillance powers beyond territorial bor-
ders, increasing the risk of cooperative agreements between State law enforcement and security agencies
to enable the evasion of domestic legal restrictions.”).
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a basis for fundamental rights. This is true not only of case law, such as the
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez,23 dealing with a search
by U.S. agents of a Mexican national’s property in Mexico, that non-resident
aliens are not protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
It is also true of public debate more generally, which frequently starts from
the assumption that citizens naturally have constitutional rights, whereas
foreigners do not.24
While this type of citizenship discourse is especially prominent in the
United States, it is by no means confined to it. Notably, the statutes regu-
lating surveillance powers in the “Five Eyes” countries frequently make dis-
tinctions between eavesdropping on citizens (and permanent residents)
versus non-citizens, as well as surveillance that takes place in or outside the
state’s territory.25 Under these statutory frameworks non-citizens enjoy
fewer protections than citizens, if they have any rights at all. For instance,
some of the most far-reaching surveillance programs conducted by the NSA
were authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA).26 Section 702(b) of FISA explicitly limits such authorizations so
as to prohibit surveillance of any person known to be located in the United
States, and of any U.S. person (defined as a U.S. citizen or permanent resi-
23. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
24. For example, when commenting on various Snowden disclosures, NSA spokespersons frequently
say that the NSA respects the privacy of U.S. persons:  “[a]ny implication that NSA’s foreign intelligence
collection is focused on the social media communications of everyday Americans is not true.” Richard
Esposito et al., Snowden Docs Reveal British Spies Snooped on YouTube and Facebook, NBC News, Jan. 27,
2014, http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-
spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite. Even the critics of expansive governmental counterterror-
ism policies invoke citizenship. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony D. Romero, Exec. Dir., Am. Civil Liberties
Union to the Editor, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/when-
the-president-orders-a-killing.html?_r=0. (“If President Obama is allowed to execute American citizens
without judicial review and outside the theater of war, that astonishing power will forever reside in the
hands of future presidents.”) See also Jennifer Granick, Eight Questions PCLOB Should Ask About Section
702, Just Security (Feb.11, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2014/02/11/questions-pclob-
section-702/.
25. For example, in Australia, §§ 8-9 and 15 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 create various
safeguards for Australian persons, defined as Australian citizens or permanent residents. Intelligence Services
Act 2001 §§ 8-9, 15. In New Zealand, § 14 of the Government Communications Security Bureau Act
2003 categorically prohibits the issuance of interception warrants for intelligence-gathering purposes
with respect to New Zealand citizens or permanent residents, unless they act as an agent or representative
for a foreign government, organization or person. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003.
§ 16 similarly protects New Zealand citizens and permanent residents from those interception powers
that do not require a warrant. In Canada, § 273.64(2) of the National Defence Act requires intelligence-
gathering measures not to be “directed at Canadians or any person in Canada,” with Canadians being
defined as Canadian citizens and permanent residents. National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5. UK
legislation, on the other hand, does not make distinctions on the basis of citizenship. Rather, § 8(4)-(5)
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides that interception warrants do not need to
target a specific person, premises, or communication if the interception is directed against an “external
communication.” Investigatory Powers Act, (2000) § 8(4)-(5) CURRENT LAW. S. 20 RIPA further
defines “external communication” as “a communication sent or received outside the British Islands.” Id.
This distinction between external and internal communications essentially allows for the bulk collection
of any external communications under general warrants issued by a minister.
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1881 et seq.
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dent) reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. In other
words, while non-U.S. citizens and permanent residents will be protected
against surveillance when they set foot on U.S. soil, unlike U.S. citizens and
permanent residents they will enjoy no such protection when they are
outside the United States. For FISA’s drafters, therefore, the physical pres-
ence of an individual on U.S. territory, and his or her citizenship or resi-
dence status, were criteria of categorical normative relevance with regard to
the enjoyment of the right to privacy. Like for the Supreme Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen is entitled to privacy no matter where he is lo-
cated, but the same does not apply for an alien.
In order to assess the implications of a citizenship-oriented approach in
international human rights law, we first need to look at its possible justifica-
tions. For example, when responding to the advocates of a global human
right to privacy,27 Orin Kerr pointed out that the citizenship-oriented ap-
proach stems from a conception of “governments as having legitimacy be-
cause of the consent of the governed, which triggers rights and obligations
to and from its citizens and those in its territorial borders.”28 Kerr’s state-
ment is but an articulation of a long-standing tradition in American legal
thought: an essentially contractarian conception of the Constitution, which
sees it as the manifestation of a social compact.
But while social contract theories have a long pedigree, their application
in this particular context and in this particular way is deeply problematic,
both descriptively and normatively. First, there is quite a leap between the
postulated, fictional social contract in Western political philosophy and the
drafting and interpretation of positive legal instruments such as the U.S.
Constitution. Second, the text of the relevant amendments to the Constitu-
tion generally does not differentiate between the rights of citizens and non-
citizens, normally speaking of “persons.”29 Third, there is little if any his-
torical evidence that the framers of the Constitution or of its subsequent
amendments paid any attention to the question of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of fundamental rights, or made such strong associations between citi-
zenship and rights. Indeed, that same founding generation was steeped in
natural law thinking, proudly declaring “these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness.” Self-evident truths and unalienable rights do not mix well
with citizenship.
27. See, e.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, Just Security
(Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/29/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights/; Kenneth
Roth, NSA: Our Analogue Spying Laws Must Catch Up with the Digital Era, The Guardian (Nov. 10,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/10/nsa-analogue-spying-laws-surveillance-
digital-era.
28. Orin Kerr, A Reply to David Cole on Rights of Foreigners Abroad, Lawfare (Nov. 2, 2013, 1:54 AM),
www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/a-reply-to-david-cole-on-rights-of-foreigners-abroad/.
29. The Fourth Amendment, for its part, speaks of the “people.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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Fourth, even if one accepts the general validity of social contract theories,
as the Declaration of Independence does when it proclaims that “to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed,” it does not follow from this alone
that the contract protects only its parties and that others are completely
excluded; that is, that only those who politically legitimated and continue
to legitimate the social contract (say by having the rights to vote and to
stand for office) are those who can benefit from it.30 In other words, one can
both believe that governments rest on the consent of the governed, derive
their just powers therefrom, and are accountable to their citizens, and that
governments owe certain basic duties toward non-citizens as well. The two
are not necessarily incompatible.
While social compact thinking undoubtedly informed the U.S. Supreme
Court’s case law on the application of constitutional rights to foreigners and
abroad, as in Verdugo, it would be a stretch to argue that the Court’s juris-
prudence flows from any coherent grand theory. Rather, the lack of specific
textual guidance in the Constitution allowed the Court to make its approach
up as it went along, and this is what it continues to do to this very day.31
The Court’s case law has never been consistent—it has oscillated between
universalist impulses to protect fundamental rights of all persons and the
fear that this protection would be unmanageable in practice, often leading it
to resort to citizenship as a limiting principle.
Thus, for example, the majority of the Court in Eisentrager32 held that
non-U.S. nationals imprisoned by U.S. forces in occupied Germany were not
constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court,
justifying the lack of protection for foreigners by saying that “[c]itizenship
as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul
invoked it in his appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor dimin-
ished the importance of citizenship, nor have they sapped the vitality of a
citizen’s claims upon his government for protection.”33 On the other hand,
Justice Black wrote for the minority that
Paul was fortunate enough to be a Roman citizen when he was
made the victim of prejudicial charges; that privileged status af-
forded him an appeal to Rome, with a right to meet his “accusers
face to face.” Acts 25:16. But other martyrized disciples were not
30. If that were the case, then those classes of people who were historically denied the right the vote
(e.g. women, African-Americans, or the poor) would also not be entitled to constitutional protection. On
the other hand, through most of American history voting rights were not inextricably tied to citizenship
and most U.S. states have experience with alien suffrage. See generally Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local
Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391
(1993).
31. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (5-4 decision) (holding that non-U.S. nationals
imprisoned in Guantanamo have a constitutional right to habeas corpus).
32. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
33. Id. at 769.
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so fortunate. Our Constitution has led people everywhere to hope
and believe that, wherever our laws control, all people, whether
our citizens or not, would have an equal chance before the bar of
criminal justice . . . . Our nation proclaims a belief in the dignity
of human beings as such, no matter what their nationality or
where they happen to live.34
We can clearly see how the Eisentrager majority emphasized citizenship,
even though its prime concern was a practical one, namely how habeas corpus
could apply to thousands of foreign prisoners of war. For its part, the minor-
ity spoke the language of universality, invoking “the dignity of human be-
ings as such, no matter what their nationality,” and Eisentrager was not the
only case showing a deep disagreement among the justices on the normative
justification for fundamental rights. As was shown so clearly by the works of
Kal Raustiala35 and Gerald Neuman,36 the Supreme Court’s case law has
ebbed and flowed between many different ideologies and policy considera-
tions. Its decisions on the Constitution’s applicability to foreigners and na-
tionals both within and outside U.S. territory are not set in stone, but need
to be critically and continually reassessed.
In that regard, grounding fundamental rights in citizenship is open to
critiques of moral arbitrariness.37 In the vast majority of cases we acquire
citizenship merely as an accident of birth, not because of any moral desert
(for example, because we served in the armed forces, or made some other
contribution to society). For example, consider the right to life—in the U.S.
constitutional context the right not to have one’s life taken without due
process of law—and the debate regarding the use of drones for targeted
killing of suspected terrorists. Compare the cases of Anwar al-Awlaki, the
militant Islamic preacher killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen on Septem-
ber 30, 2011,38 and that of an undeniably innocent 10-year-old child also
killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen on June 9, 2013.39 One needs to
seriously re-think any theory that argues that al-Awlaki, an avowed enemy
of the United States who wanted nothing more than to destroy its social
compact—but who just happened to have been born on U.S. soil—was con-
34. Id. at 798.
35. Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Territori-
ality in American Law (2009).
36. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909 (1991); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extra-
territorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (2009). See also Gerald L.
Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law
(1996).
37. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in
the War on Terrorism (2003).
38. Martin Chulov, Al-Qaida Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is Dead, says Yemen, The Guardian (Sept. 30,
2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-awlaki-dead.
39. Sarah Knuckey, Anonymous U.S. Officials Admit CIA Accidentally Killed a Yemeni Child in a Drone
Strike, Just Security (Nov. 18, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/11/18/anonymous-officials-admit-
cia-accidentally-killed-yemeni-child-drone-strike/.
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stitutionally entitled not to have his life taken without due process of law,
whereas the perfectly innocent but non-citizen child had no such entitle-
ment. And it was precisely on the basis of such a theory that the strike
against al-Awlaki was conducted.40
The plausibility of the contractarian, citizenship account is not helped by
its manifest inconsistency. Note how even among ardent contractarians it is
routinely accepted that foreigners have constitutional rights once they are on
U.S. territory. This is simply obvious. But the obviousness is rarely explained,
other than by arguing to tradition—it has always been like this—which is
of course normatively neither here nor there.41 In other words, if one is enti-
tled to fundamental rights because one is a citizen and hence a member of
the social contract, it is not at all clear why one would become a member
deserving of protection merely by touching one atom of American soil, like
some modern-day Antaeus.
In Eisentrager, Justice Jackson tried to explain this inconsistency by saying
that a foreigner’s “[m]ere lawful presence in the country creates an implied
assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights.”42 It seems no less
dubious for fundamental rights to depend on a stamp in one’s passport than
on the passport itself. To disprove this theory one need only point to aliens
present in the country unlawfully, who in the United States number in the
millions, whose basic rights are unquestionably deserving of protection, but
who have no such “implied assurance of safe conduct.” From a purely con-
tractarian perspective territorial sovereignty cannot possess some magical
protective quality for the foreigner—a consistent contractarian would have
to accept, at the very least, that illegal aliens enjoy no constitutional rights
whatsoever.43
40. See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at North-
western University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/
2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. Attorney General Holder stated inter alia that  “the government must
take into account all relevant constitutional considerations with respect to United States citizens—even
those who are leading efforts to kill innocent Americans. Of these, the most relevant is the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause, which says that the government may not deprive a citizen of his or her life
without due process of law.” Note that the Due Process Clause actually says that “no person . . . shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It makes no mention of citizenship—
but the Attorney General then went on to articulate what due process would require under the circum-
stances (e.g. imminence of threat and no feasibility of capture), limitations on the use of lethal force that
would in his view not apply to non-citizens.
41. For one defense of the various distinctions drawn in the U.S. context, see Andrew Kent, Citizenship
and Protection, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 101 (2014); A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitu-
tion, 95 Geo. L.J. 463 (2007).
42. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770.
43. Needless to say, this is not the position in U.S. law. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
210 (1982) (holding that “[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’
in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have
long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that “it must be concluded
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In other words, it is normatively incoherent to say that before being
killed by the U.S. government (1) a U.S. national on U.S. soil is entitled to
due process; (2) a non-U.S. national lawfully on U.S. soil (e.g. a tourist) is
entitled to due process; (3) a non-U.S. national unlawfully on U.S. soil is
entitled to due process; (4) a U.S. national outside U.S. soil is also entitled to
due process; but that only (5) a non-U.S. national outside U.S. territory has
no entitlement to due process. It seems impossible to identify a principle
whereby (5) can truly be distinguished from (1)-(4), and I have never seen it
persuasively explained why this should be the case—this distinction is all
too often assumed rather than argued, and even when it is argued this is
usually done in a perfunctory way.44
The citizenship-based distinctions drawn in U.S. law, as well as in the
laws of other states engaging in mass surveillance (or possible extraterritorial
violations of individual rights more generally), thus cannot be justified
merely by crying “social compact.” Their rationale is far more prosaic: one
not grounded in moral theory, principle, or philosophy, but in political ex-
pediency.45 It is a basic feature of human nature that it is easier for us to
discount the interests, emotions, and rights of those who are distant, differ-
ent, and de-personalized. While our squeamishness and moral intuitions
will not so easily allow us to disregard the rights of a neighbor with whom
we will empathize (even if he is an illegal alien), drones in Pakistan are a
different story. Such is also the case with surveillance—we will naturally
care more if it happens to us, or to people like us, than if it happens to
nameless outsiders.
My point in making this rather substantial digression into U.S. constitu-
tional law is that the question of its extraterritorial application, to citizens as
well as to aliens, was not predetermined by the Constitution’s Framers.
Rather, it is, and has always been, a moral choice. It is ultimately for U.S.
lawyers, officials, courts, and the general public to make this choice. They
Fifth and Sixth] amendments”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the
“fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . These
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws.”).
44. See Review Group Report, supra note 3, at 152 (demonstrating a similar argument applied in the
surveillance context).
45. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of Modern Warfare, in Drone
Wars: The Transformation of Armed Conflict and the Promise of Law (Peter Bergen & Daniel
Rothenberg, eds., forthcoming 2014) (draft at 18–19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2268596 (“Differentiating the treatment of threats coming from citizens as opposed to non-
citizens is a deeply controversial matter, both in theory and in international law. Particularly when force
can be used only once the enemy ‘target’ is highly individuated, in terms of his specific actions, it is not
at all clear why, in principle, an American citizen in the same overseas location who poses the identical
threat as a non-American should have greater legal protection. As a matter of domestic politics, perhaps,
one can understand why political leaders would want to ensure their own citizens that they receive special
protection against the exceptional circumstance of their own government using lethal force against them.
But as a matter of law, why should governments have the power to kill non-citizens who could otherwise
be captured but not kill citizens in that circumstance?”).
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may do so consistently, or not.46 And the contours of that choice may well
evolve over time, as circumstances change.
B. The Decline of Citizenship
Indeed, that process of evolution may currently be underway. In the
targeted killing context, for example, even though his Attorney General47
and the Department of Justice48 argued that outside U.S. territory only citi-
zens are constitutionally entitled not to be killed without due process of law,
in a May 2013 speech on U.S. counterterrorism strategy President Obama
articulated a somewhat different sentiment:
Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional is-
sues that are not present in other strikes—which is why my ad-
ministration submitted information about Awlaki to the
Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and
briefed the Congress before this strike as well.  But the high
threshold that we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all po-
tential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are
American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of
every human life.49
The standards the President referred to ostensibly include a near-certainty
that no civilians will be killed or injured, and the infeasibility of capture of
the targeted individual.  While it is clear that the President was articulating
standards of policy, rather than advocating a shift in the constitutional posi-
tion, he was still saying that his administration will treat citizens and non-
citizens alike in the targeted killings context.50 The substantive standard
would thus be the same—whether it is high enough, or is actually enforced,
is a different matter. And the reason the President gave for applying the
same standard was one very much grounded in a universalist conception of
46. See also Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties:
Law, Principles, and Policy 67–83 (2011).
47. See Holder, supra note 40.
48. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior
Operational Leader of al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force, available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
49. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/
2013/05/23/president-obama-speaks-us-counterterrorism-strategy#transcript).
50. Simultaneously with the speech the administration released a policy guidance. See Press Release,
The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use
of Force in Counterterrorism Operations outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities
(May 23, 2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-
standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism. The substantive standards do not distinguish be-
tween citizens and non-citizens but do say that “[i]f the United States considers an operation against a
terrorist identified as a U.S. person, the Department of Justice will conduct an additional legal analysis to
ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States.” Id.
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individual rights—the need to respect “the inherent dignity of every human
life.”
In the surveillance context we can observe a similar development. When
discussing Section 702 of the FISA, which is directed against non-U.S. per-
sons located outside U.S. territory, the President’s Review Group noted in
its report the need to safeguard the legitimate privacy interests of foreigners,
while simultaneously justifying the distinctions drawn by the FISA in the
following terms:
FISA’s especially strict limitations on government surveillance of
United States persons reflects not only a respect for individual
privacy, but also—and fundamentally—a deep concern about po-
tential government abuse within our own political system. The spe-
cial protections for United States persons must therefore be
understood as a crucial safeguard of democratic accountability and
effective self-governance within the American political system. In
light of that history and those concerns, there is good reason for
every nation to enact special restrictions on government surveil-
lance of those persons who participate directly in its own system
of self-governance.51
This reasoning is unpersuasive. It is certainly true that the surveillance of
ordinary people on a mass scale will be detrimental to any free, democratic
society, and has been the hallmark of many repressive regimes, but this does
not ipso facto justify drawing categorical distinctions between citizens (or
permanent residents) and foreigners, whose privacy interests are no less wor-
thy of protection.
Indeed, the FISA itself does not actually draw distinctions in protection
on the basis of direct participation in the U.S. system of self-governance.
Section 702(b)(1) of the FISA provides that authorized surveillance measures
“may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to
be located in the United States.”52 In other words, an ordinary tourist or
visitor to the United States would be equally protected by the FISA as a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident, as would be the case with the Fourth Amend-
ment. And such persons certainly do not directly participate in the American
system of self-governance. Neither do U.S. permanent residents, who only
have the potential for such participation once they acquire citizenship, yet
are (unlike non-nationals or residents) protected by Section 7(b)(3) of the
FISA even when they are abroad. It is hard to see how affording greater
protections to, for example, a U.S. citizen who has been living in France for
51. Review Group Report, supra note 3, at 154. Somewhat cynically the Report proceeds to add that
affording greater protection to U.S. persons as opposed to non-U.S. persons has the potential to promote
democratic accountability and ideals abroad, essentially because other states would be shown how to
enact greater protections for their own nationals or residents and would emulate the United States. Id.
52. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 36 (emphasis added).
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the past 30 years and does not vote in any U.S. elections, as opposed to an
ordinary French citizen also living in France, can be justified on the basis of
the need to protect American democratic self-government.
Be that as it may, the Review Group went on to note that “there are
sound, indeed, compelling reasons to treat the citizens of other nations with
dignity and respect” and that failing to do so can have numerous adverse
consequences on U.S. interests.53 But perhaps the most compelling reason
for protecting the privacy of foreigners, in the Review Group’s view,
is the simple and fundamental issue of respect for personal privacy
and human dignity—wherever people may reside. The right of
privacy has been recognized as a basic human right that all na-
tions should respect. Both Article 12 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights proclaim that “No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy. . . .”
Although that declaration provides little guidance about what is
meant by “arbitrary or unlawful interference,” the aspiration is
clear. The United States should be a leader in championing the
protection by all nations of fundamental human rights, including
the right of privacy, which is central to human dignity.54
The Review Group is here not only speaking the language of human
rights and human dignity, but is directly invoking the UDHR and the
ICCPR in the foreign surveillance context. President Obama also took up
the dignity/universality theme in his response to the Review Group’s report.
While his major speech on the topic was mainly geared toward domestic
audiences, the President nonetheless noted that the “bottom line is that
people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that
the United States is not spying on ordinary people who don’t threaten our
national security, and that we take their privacy concerns into account in our
policies and procedures. This applies to foreign leaders as well.”55 In his
policy directive, however, the President was even more explicit:
53. Review Group Report, supra note 3, at 155.
54. Id. at 155–56.
55. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals
Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/
17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence). The President continued on to say that:
Given the understandable attention that this issue has received, I have made clear to the intel-
ligence community that unless there is a compelling national security purpose, we will not
monitor the communications of heads of state and government of our close friends and allies.
And I’ve instructed my national security team, as well as the intelligence community, to work
with foreign counterparts to deepen our coordination and cooperation in ways that rebuild
trust going forward.
Now let me be clear:  Our intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about
the intentions of governments—as opposed to ordinary citizens—around the world, in the
same way that the intelligence services of every other nation does.  We will not apologize
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All persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless
of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and all persons
have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal
information. U.S. signals intelligence activities must, therefore,
include appropriate safeguards for the personal information of all
individuals, regardless of the nationality of the individual to
whom the information pertains or where that individual resides.56
The appropriate safeguards under the directive include treating U.S. and
non-U.S. persons equally with regard to the minimization procedures on the
dissemination and retention of personal information, data security, access,
and quality: “[t]o the maximum extent feasible consistent with the national
security, these policies and procedures are to be applied equally to the per-
sonal information of all persons, regardless of nationality.”57
One could criticize President Obama’s reform as being largely cosmetic or
rhetorical. The “national security” caveat allows for wiggle-room, and dis-
tinctions remain in U.S. law on surveillance on the basis of nationality or
immigration status, for example in the FISA. Even so, the rhetoric itself still
matters. The explicit recognition that foreigners have dignity and privacy
interests deserving of respect is of great importance, and undermines the
exclusionary social contractarian thinking that pervades much of the area. It
is also consistent with a general diminishment of the importance of citizen-
ship in a globalized world.58
This is not to say, however, that the United States has completely em-
braced a universalist vision of individual rights. The situation is very much
one of flux, in a process that is both political and cultural and ultimately
might not coalesce around the rights of foreigners or may pay them only lip
service. Who knows, for example, what the next elections will bring, or
whether what progress has already been made could become yet one more
casualty of a possible major terrorist attack.
C. Citizenship and Human Rights
The U.S. polity is in the process of deciding whether fundamental rights
should be grounded in citizenship. But whatever that choice ultimately
turns out to be within the United States, it has already been made in the
international human rights system. By their very definition, human rights
cannot turn on nationality alone. Human rights treaties are not social com-
simply because our services may be more effective.  But heads of state and government with
whom we work closely, and on whose cooperation we depend, should feel confident that we are
treating them as real partners.  And the changes I’ve ordered do just that.
56. Office of the White House Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive — Signals Intelligence Activi-
ties/PPD-28, White House (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/
presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 307 (2013).
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pacts, nor can their applicability depend on morally arbitrary criteria such as
the mere accident of birth; they are grounded in the idea that all human
beings possess inherent dignity deserving of protection.59 As well put by
Ronald Dworkin, “[t]he domain of human rights has no place for
passports.”60
The idea of the universality of human rights was born out of bitter experi-
ence. History has long taught us that predicating fundamental rights upon
citizenship allows for rights to be denied if citizenship is revoked or cur-
tailed. I need only mention the disemancipation of the German Jews
through the 1935 Nuremberg Laws,61 or the stripping of the citizenship of
South African blacks through the creation of the Bantustans and the passing
of the 1970 Black States Citizenship Act.62 Although there is no inevitable
causal relationship between apartheid and genocide, and predicating rights
upon citizenship, we do know where that road in extremis can take us. This is
why human rights jurisprudence outside the relatively narrow areas of im-
migration and political rights has treated nationality as a potentially prohib-
ited grounds of discrimination, allowing distinctions based upon citizenship
only if they are objectively and reasonably justified.63
59. Note, in that regard, the UDHR’s emphatic endorsement in its preamble of the idea that the
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” and the admonition of its Article 1
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”
60. Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? 48 (2006).
61. See generally Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to
the Final Solution 24–25 (1995).
62. See generally John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978);
James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 338–348 (2nd ed. 2007).
63. See, e.g., Gaygusuz v. Austria (Judgment), App. No. 17371/90, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 42,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58060 (holding that “very
weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment
based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention”). The holding in
Gaygusuz was affirmed, for example, in Andrejeva v. Latvia (Judgment), App. No. 55707/00, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91388; U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant (1986), para. 2,
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139acfc.html (“[T]he general rule is that each one of the
rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens. Aliens
receive the benefit of the general requirement of non-discrimination in respect of the rights guaranteed in
the Covenant, as provided for in article 2 thereof. This guarantee applies to aliens and citizens alike.
Exceptionally, some of the rights recognized in the Covenant are expressly applicable only to citizens (art.
25), while article 13 applies only to aliens.”) and para. 7 (“Aliens thus have an inherent right to life,
protected by law, and may not be arbitrarily deprived of life. . . . They may not be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence. . . . Aliens are entitled to
equal protection by the law. There shall be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the applica-
tion of these rights. These rights of aliens may be qualified only by such limitations as may be lawfully
imposed under the Covenant.”); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: Nature of the
General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 31] (“As indicated in General Comment 15 adopted at the twenty-
seventh session (1986), the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but
must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers,
refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the
jurisdiction of the State Party.”); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Recom-
mendation No. 30: Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004).
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Accordingly, we can draw two basic lessons from the preceding discussion
for the applicability of human rights treaties to foreign surveillance
programs:
First, the threshold question of whether individuals enjoy human rights
generally, and the right to privacy specifically, vis-a`-vis a particular state
should in principle not depend on whether they have that state’s nationality.
When it comes to the interpretation of the jurisdiction clauses in human
rights treaties, which I will address below, an individual cannot be within
the jurisdiction of a state party merely because he or she is a national of that
state.64 In other words, if the United Kingdom simultaneously intercepts
the electronic communication of one U.K. national and one non-U.K. na-
tional living outside the country, either both or neither have human rights
vis-a`-vis the United Kingdom. The citizen must not be treated
preferentially.
Second, if human rights treaties do apply to a particular interception (or
other surveillance activity), and the intercepting state draws distinctions on
the basis of nationality (as many do), this potentially implicates not only the
privacy guarantees in the treaties, but also their provisions on equality and
non-discrimination. A nationality-based distinction would be justified only
if it pursues a legitimate aim (such as the protection of national security)
and the measures taken serve that aim and are proportionate.65 If the ratio-
nale for protecting privacy interests is the value of the autonomy and inde-
pendence of individuals—of enabling them to lead their lives without state
intrusion—then distinctions based on nationality alone would seem hard to
justify.66 This is particularly so because it simply cannot reasonably be ar-
gued that non-citizens as a class are inherently more dangerous to the secur-
ity of a state than its own citizens or permanent residents (viz. the July 7,
2005 London tube terrorist bombings, conducted by U.K. nationals, the
November 5, 2009 mass shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, by Nidal Hasan, a
U.S. national and then a major in the U.S. Army, or the April 15, 2013
Boston Marathon bombings, perpetrated by the Tsarnaev brothers, one of
whom was a U.S. citizen and the other a U.S. permanent resident).67
64. As a formal matter, this is so because the concept of state jurisdiction in human rights treaties is
not the same as that of a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe the rules of its own domestic law, under which
nationality is a recognized head of jurisdiction. That, for example, the United States can pass penal laws
criminalizing murder if committed by one of its own citizens abroad, or tax legislation requiring its
citizens living abroad to pay taxes to the U.S. government (both of which are exercises of prescriptive
jurisdiction), does not mean that an American in Paris who commits a murder or fails to pay his U.S.
taxes is ipso facto subject to the U.S. jurisdiction in the sense of Art. 2(1) of ICCPR. See generally Mila-
novic, supra note 46, at 19–41.
65. See supra text accompanying note 63.
66. Cf. the discussion in the Review Group Report, supra note 3, at 156–57, on how some distinc-
tions would be “warranted by the special obligation the United States Government owes to ‘the people’ of
the United States.”
67. See also Sandra Laville, MI5 Chief Says 34 UK Terror Plots Disrupted Since 7/7 Attacks, The Guardian
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/07/mi5-chief-34-uk-terror-plots-dis-
rupted (reporting on the testimony of the chief of the UK Security Service (MI5) before the Intelligence
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This is not to say, on the other hand, that no distinctions may be drawn
at all on the basis of the location or type of surveillance or other individual
characteristic of the target. But it would be difficult for the United King-
dom to justify, for example, having one surveillance regime for its own citi-
zens living in the country, and another for foreign nationals who are also in
the country, or to treat citizens and non-citizens radically differently in an
extraterritorial context.68 Thus, for instance, in the Belmarsh case the House
of Lords struck down the U.K. government’s post-9/11 order derogating
from Article 5 of the ECHR, which allowed for the preventive security de-
tention of foreign nationals, on the grounds that distinguishing between
nationals and foreigners in the counter-terrorism context was disproportion-
ate, discriminatory, and irrational.69 This was also the conclusion of a unani-
mous Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, despite the
fact that it was prepared to pay the United Kingdom significant deference in
determining whether an emergency threatening the life of the nation in the
sense of Article 15 of the ECHR existed and what measures were appropriate
to deal with that emergency:
The choice by the Government and Parliament of an immigration
measure to address what was essentially a security issue had the
result of failing adequately to address the problem, while impos-
ing a disproportionate and discriminatory burden of indefinite de-
tention on one group of suspected terrorists. As the House of
Lords found, there was no significant difference in the potential
adverse impact of detention without charge on a national or on a
non-national who in practice could not leave the country because
of fear of torture abroad. . . . [T]he Court notes that the national
courts, including SIAC, which saw both the open and the closed
material, were not convinced that the threat from non-nationals
was more serious than that from nationals. In conclusion, there-
fore, the Court, like the House of Lords, and contrary to the Gov-
ernment’s contention, finds that the derogating measures were
disproportionate in that they discriminated unjustifiably between
nationals and non-nationals.70
In sum, one cannot escape the conclusion that under the moral logic of
human rights law, citizens and non-citizens are equally deserving of protec-
and Security Committee of Parliament, stating that “[t]here are several thousands of individuals in this
country who I would describe as supporting violent extremism or engaged in it in some way that we are
aware of, and the terrorist plots that we have dealt with have almost all come from those people”).
68. The United Kingdom, unlike the United States, does not discriminate on the basis of nationality,
with RIPA distinguishing only between external and internal communications. See supra note 25.
69. A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) [43] (appeal
taken from Eng.).
70. A. v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 186–90 (2009),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91403.
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tion of their rights generally, and privacy specifically. In the counterterror-
ism and surveillance context, non-citizens neither inherently pose a greater
threat to a state’s security than its citizens, nor is their private information
of inherently greater value or interest to the state.71 If citizenship is norma-
tively irrelevant for the threshold question of whether a human rights treaty
applies to a particular act of surveillance, and may be relevant only for the
substantive merits question of whether the right to privacy or the prohibi-
tion of discrimination have been violated, then the truly critical question
becomes the territorial scope of human rights treaties on the basis of the
location of the individual and/or the interference with his rights, regardless of that
person’s nationality. With this in mind, let us look at whether the text of
the ICCPR allows for its extraterritorial application.
II. Interpreting the ICCPR
A. Comparing the ICCPR and the ECHR
The scope of many human rights treaties is at least partly determined by
how we interpret their jurisdiction clauses, and here we can observe some
important differences. I will limit this analysis solely to the ICCPR and the
ECHR—the former because most states engaging in overseas surveillance
are parties to it (like the United States) and the latter because of the relative
strength and influence of its enforcement mechanism and the European
Court of Human Rights’ extensive (and conflicting) jurisprudence on ques-
tions of territorial application.72 This section will deal specifically with the
ICCPR, the most widely ratified human rights treaty protecting the right to
privacy, with 168 states parties as of the time of writing,73 and the text of
which poses unique interpretative problems that we do not find in other
human rights treaties. I will also address in the section the categorical posi-
tion against the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR that has been es-
poused by the United States, as the state with most sophisticated electronic
surveillance capabilities.
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides that “[e]ach State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant,” whereas Article 1 of the ECHR stipulates that the “High Con-
tracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” The main difference
between the two provisions is the ICCPR’s mention of territory. The ICCPR
also explicitly distinguishes between the obligations to respect and to ensure
71. If anything, the value of the information of the people living within the state, most of whom
would be its citizens, would be greater due to the increased potential that these individuals have to harm
the state when present in its own territory, as was for instance the case with the 9/11 hijackers.
72. See generally Milanovic, supra note 46.
73. Status of ICCPR, supra note 5.
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human rights, while the ECHR speaks of the obligation to respect in the
heading of Article 1, but only of the obligation to secure in the actual text.74
The magic word in both texts is (state) “jurisdiction,” but the question
arises whether the ICCPR’s seemingly conjunctive reference to territory ad-
mits of any extraterritorial application, i.e. whether an individual who is
subject to the jurisdiction but not within the territory of the state can be
protected by the ICCPR. If the ICCPR can in principle apply extraterritori-
ally, a further question is whether the interpretations of the ICCPR and the
ECHR in that regard should align or not, bearing in mind the differences
between the two texts.
B. The U.S. Position on the ICCPR
The United States has argued that the Covenant’s text precludes any kind
of extraterritorial application, i.e. that an individual who is not located in a
territory over which the state has sovereign title can never have rights under
the treaty vis-a`-vis that state. But the U.S. views on the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the ICCPR have not been as clear, long-standing or principled
as some claim.75 It is true that during the drafting of the Covenant the
United States proposed to modify the original language of what was to be-
come Article 2(1)—“within its jurisdiction,” the formula that was taken up
by the drafters of the ECHR76—so that it became “within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction.”77 Much was later made of this drafting change by
the George W. Bush administration in the context of the “war on terror”, as
well as by Michael Dennis writing in the American Journal of International
Law.78 Yet not only are the travaux much more ambiguous than the U.S.
government has claimed, but it is simply factually wrong to insist on a
supposed half-century of continuity in the U.S. position. Indeed, the story of
the ICCPR’s drafting and adoption is riddled with interruptions and de-
74. On positive obligations in the ECHR and the ICCPR, see generally Pieter van Dijk et al.,
Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 13 (4th ed. 2006); Man-
fred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 37–41 (2d ed.
2005). I will return to the distinction between positive and negative obligations below.
75. See, e.g., Cable from the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations in Geneva,
UN Human Rights Committee – USG July 17018 Public Hearing, http://www.state.gov/documents/organi-
zation/131739.pdf, para. 12 (noting the opposition of members of the Human Rights Committee to the
United States’ “long-standing and principled legal interpretation” that the ICCPR is not applicable to
activities of States Parties outside of their territory); Ashley Deeks, Does the ICCPR Establish an Extraterri-
torial Right to Privacy?, Lawfare (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/does-the-iccpr-
establish-an-extraterritorial-right-to-privacy/ (noting the United States’ position that the scope of the
ICCPR limits its application to U.S. Government activity within U.S. territory only).
76. See 3 Collected Edition of the “Travaux Pre´paratoires” of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights 260 (1976).
77. See Marc Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Pre´paratoires” of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights 49 (1987).
78. See Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Con-
flict and Military Occupation, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 119 (2005).
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lays.79 The principal drafting of the text was mostly done from 1947 to
1954; the United States actively took part. But the ideological divisions
brought about by the Cold War made it impossible for states to agree to
what was then a single human rights Covenant. After much wrangling, a
political decision was made to split the Covenant into two, followed by
further deliberations and the adoption of the texts and the opening for sig-
nature of the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966. The two Covenants entered into
force ten years later, in 1976. The United States did not even sign the two
Covenants until October 5, 1977, under the Carter administration.80 It ulti-
mately ratified the ICCPR only in 1992, under the George H.W. Bush
administration, and never ratified the ICESCR.81
Rather than having a consistent position against the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the ICCPR, during most of this extended period neither the
United States nor other states expressed any kind of clear view, let alone
agreement, on the Covenant’s territorial scope. A deeper look at the travaux
in the main drafting stages in particular shows the complete lack of concep-
tual coherence among the drafters. Territorial scope was but one of many
issues they were considering, and while some states were concerned about
the application of the Covenant to specific problems (notably that the Covenant
should not require them to protect their nationals abroad against third states,
or legislate for the people of occupied Germany), the preparatory work is
remarkably unhelpful when it comes to any first principles regarding the
interpretation of Article 2(1).82 The travaux certainly do not express a clear
sentiment by the drafters that the Covenant should never apply extraterrito-
rially. This was indeed the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s conclusion
upon looking at the travaux in the Wall case,83 and is also the conclusion of a
number of other detailed examinations.84
79. On the course of the drafting of the Covenant see, e.g., Bossuyt, supra note 77; Karen da
Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties 17–40 (2012);
Michal Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial
Application of Human Rights Treaties 75–120 (2009).
80. See Status of ICCPR, supra note 5 (detailing signing and ratification status of the ICCPR by U.N.
member states); see also Id., https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=iv-3&chapter=
4&lang=en. (detailing signing and ratification status of ICESCR by U.N. member states).
81. Id.
82. See Milanovic, supra note 45, at 222–27.
83. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/
1671.pdf (stating that “the travaux pre´paratoires of the Covenant confirm the [Human Rights] Commit-
tee’s interpretation of Article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the
drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they
exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only intended to prevent persons residing
abroad from asserting, vis-a`-vis their State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that
State, but of that of the State of residence.”).
84. See da Costa, supra note 78, at 40; Gondek, supra note 78, at 118–19; Noam Lubell, Extraterrito-
rial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors 195 (2010); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective:
Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 2137 (2014); Nigel
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After the adoption of the text of the ICCPR came several decades of si-
lence during which the issue of the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application was
simply not on anybody’s agenda. When the first Bush administration re-
initiated the ratification process in the U.S. Senate, no mention was made of
the question of the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application.85 Nor was the issue
raised in the U.S. initial report to the Human Rights Committee,86 even
though the Committee’s first cases deciding that the Covenant can apply
extraterritorially predated both the report and the U.S. ratification.87
The first time the U.S. government clearly articulated the position that
the ICCPR cannot apply extraterritorially tout court was when its initial re-
port was discussed before the Committee in March 1995, and it did so in
response to a question by a member of the Committee:
Mr. Klein had asked whether the United States took the view that
the Covenant did not apply to government actions outside the
United States. The Covenant was not regarded as having extrater-
ritorial application. In general, where the scope of application of a
treaty was not specified, it was presumed to apply only within a
party’s territory. Article 2 of the Covenant expressly stated that
each State party undertook to respect and ensure the rights recog-
nized “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction”. That dual requirement restricted the scope of the
Covenant to persons under United States jurisdiction and within
United States territory. During the negotiating history, the words
“within its territory” had been debated and were added by vote,
with the clear understanding that such wording would limit the
obligations to within a Party’s territory.88
Note how the U.S. representative made three arguments against the extra-
territorial application of the ICCPR: (1) the existence of a default presump-
tion against extraterritorial application; (2) the ordinary meaning of “within
its territory” coupled with a conjunctive “and”; (3) the “clear understand-
ing” to that effect from the preparatory work. Of these three arguments only
Rodley, The Extraterritorial Reach and Applicability in Armed Conflict of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 628 (2009); Margaret Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:
Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333, 1361 (2007); Beth Van
Schaack, The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations, 90 Int’l
L. Stud. 20 (2014).
85. The Senate certainly made no declarations or understandings in that regard. See S. Exec. Rep.
No. 102–23 (1992), available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/senate_committee_on_
foreign_relations_report_on_the_iccpr.pdf.
86. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994).
87. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lopez v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.12/52, paras. 12.1–12.3,
U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Montero v. Uruguay,
Comm. No. 106/1981, para. 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2.
88. U.N. Human Rights. Comm., Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting, para. 20. U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR (Mar. 31, 1995).
2015 / Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance 105
(2) has real merit, and I will come to it momentarily. As already noted with
regard to (3), there most certainly was no clear understanding among the
drafters regarding the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application—indeed there
was little understanding of any kind. As for (1), it at least is manifestly
wrong. Presumptions against the extraterritorial applications of statutes are
creatures of domestic law; in the law of treaties the default rule in Article 29
of the VCLT is that a treaty applies to the state’s entire territory, rather than
merely parts thereof, but that default rule has nothing to say about extrater-
ritorial application.89
In short, the 1995 U.S. statement before the Human Rights Committee
was not the reiteration of some long-standing, consistently held position,
but was made there and then, within the contemporary political context,
particularly the 1994-1995 intervention in Haiti. Indeed, it was precisely
with regard to Haiti that Theodor Meron wrote an influential 1995 piece in
the American Journal of International Law on the extraterritoriality of human
rights treaties, one of the earliest academic treatments of the topic.90 The
Clinton administration’s position was inevitably informed by the practical
difficulties the ICCPR could pose in its present and future foreign interven-
tions, as was its similar position against the extraterritorial application of
the Refugee Convention in the 1993 Sale case before the U.S. Supreme
Court,91 again with regard to the crisis in Haiti.92
Faced with the “global war on terror,” the George W. Bush administra-
tion was happy to follow the Clinton administration’s lead. Its consolidated
second and third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee contained
a somewhat more extended argument against the extraterritorial application
of the Covenant.93 While dropping argument (1) above regarding a sup-
posed default presumption against extraterritoriality, the report again ar-
gued that the conjunctive language of Article 2(1) was clear and that the
impossibility of the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application was supported by
the drafting history.
This rigid position was rejected by the Human Rights Committee in its
case law94 and in General Comment No. 31,95 as well as by the ICJ96 and
89. For an extended discussion see Marko Milanovic, The Spatial Dimension: Treaties and Territory, in
Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Christian Tams et al. eds., forthcoming 2014), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180597. See also Milanovic, supra note 46, at 9–11.
90. Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 78 (1995).
91. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
92. See also UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obliga-
tions Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Jan. 26,
2007), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html.
93. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Report, Annex I, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005).
94. See, e.g., works cited in supra note 87.
95. Supra note 63, para. 10.
96. On the ICJ’s case law on the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see generally
Ralph Wilde, 
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most academic commentary.97 But the Bush administration did not budge.
The Obama administration, on the other hand, seemed to be somewhat
more flexible. In its fourth periodic report to the Committee, the United
States did not reaffirm its previous position, but merely noted that position
and its rejection by the Committee and the ICJ:
The United States in its prior appearances before the Committee
has articulated the position that article 2(1) would apply only to
individuals who were both within the territory of a State Party
and within that State Party’s jurisdiction. The United States is
mindful that in General Comment 31 (2004) the Committee
presented the view that “States Parties are required by article 2,
paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all
persons who may be within their territory and to all persons sub-
ject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State Party must re-
spect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if
not situated within the territory of the State Party.” The United
States is also aware of the jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice (“ICJ”), which has found the ICCPR “applicable in
respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction
outside its own territory,” as well as positions taken by other
States Parties.98
The administration thus left open the possibility of modifying the previous
categorical position. Anxious to accelerate this process, the Committee tried
to press the administration further in its list of issues, but the administra-
tion remained coy in its response, merely referring the Committee back to
the fourth U.S. report.99
We now know that the administration’s coyness was due to internal dis-
putes about the appropriateness of abandoning the categorical position. A
week before the U.S. delegation was to present its fourth report to the Com-
mittee in March 2014, two internal memoranda written by Harold Koh,
then the legal adviser to the State Department, were leaked to and published
by the New York Times.100 The first memo is on the extraterritorial applica-
Justice’s Jurisprudence on the Extraterritorial Application of International Human Rights Law Treaties, 12 Chi-
nese J. Int’l L. 639 (2013).
97. See, e.g., works cited in supra note 84.
98. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: Fourth Periodic Report, para. 505, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4 (May 22, 2012).
99. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues in Relation to the Fourth Periodic Report of the
United States of America Adopted by the Committee at its 107th Session, para. 2., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
USA/Q/4/Add.1 (Sept. 13, 2013).
100. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions Abroad,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2014, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/us-seems-
unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actions-abroad.html.
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tion of the ICCPR and dates from 2010,101 while the second is on the geo-
graphic scope of application of the Convention against Torture and dates
from 2013.102
The first opinion, which is of most interest to us here, forcefully argues
that the U.S. categorical opposition to the extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR is fundamentally flawed and should be abandoned. In particular,
Koh agrees with the critics of the U.S. position that the language of the
ICCPR is not clear and is open to several possible interpretations,103 and
that reading that language to categorically disallow extraterritorial applica-
tion would be contrary to the treaty’s object and purpose.104 Similarly, after
conducting a thorough and extensive review of U.S. governmental materials,
Koh confirms that the United States adopted the categorical position only in
1995 in the hearings before the Committee, where it was “first asserted in a
conclusory fashion.”105
However, despite the many strengths of his opinion, Koh was unable to
persuade the other relevant stakeholders within the administration to
change the position, since there were concerns that doing so might require
significant alterations to existing U.S. policies, for example with regard to
extraterritorial targeting or detention of suspected terrorists.106 Whoever
leaked the two memos to the New York Times did so precisely in order to
undermine the credibility of the U.S. position as it was about to be reas-
serted in the hearings before the Committee.107 And when the position was
in fact reasserted, it was understandably met with considerable scepticism
on the part of the Committee members.108 In its concluding observations,
the Committee thus expressed regret at the U.S. maintenance of its previous
position, and recommended its reconsideration.109
101. U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Memorandum Opinion on the Geo-
graphic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oct. 19, 2010),
available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf [here-
inafter Koh ICCPR Opinion].
102. U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Memorandum Opinion on the Geo-
graphic Scope of Application of the Convention Against Torture and Its Application in
Situations of Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2013), available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/up
loads/2014/03/state-department-cat-memo.pdf.
103. See Koh ICCPR Opinion, supra note 101, at 7–8.
104. Id. at 12–13.
105. Id. at 14; see also id. at 25–32.
106. See Savage, supra note 100.
107. See Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh’s Legal Opinions on the US Position on the Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Human Rights Treaties, Just Security (Mar. 7, 2014, 5:09 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2014/03/
07/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-position-extraterritorial-application-human-rights-treaties/.
108. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Human Rights Committee Considers Report of the United States
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14383&Lang
ID=E.
109. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of the United
States of America, advance unedited version, para. 4  (Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/03/UN-ICCPR-Concluding-Observations-USA.pdf.
108 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
To conclude, the supposed consistency of the U.S. position on the
ICCPR’s extraterritorial application should not be overstated. Nor should
we portray the U.S. position, which today is definitely in the minority inter-
nationally, as some kind of long-standing historical understanding of the
Covenant that is today unjustifiably under threat from human rights and
judicial activists, who are (yet again) trying to impose obligations on states
without their consent. The U.S. position was contested from the moment it
was articulated in 1995. What is true, as much as for the ECHR as for the
ICCPR, is that until the 1990s very few people paid serious attention to the
possibility of the extraterritorial application of human rights. This is not, I
submit, because the states parties shared an agreement that the treaties do not
apply outside their territories,110 but rather because culturally the rights of
others were largely beyond contemplation, especially during the Cold War.
The process of human rights acculturation, through which the dignity and
interests of others came to be seen as being worthy of protection, took its
time. But while the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, es-
pecially during armed conflict, may have been unthinkable for most of the
treaties’ lifetime, that is no longer the case today.111
C. The ICCPR’s Text: Applying the Auschwitz Rule
The U.S. position may well change in the future and embrace the current
majority—whether this actually happens will depend on political develop-
ments that are difficult to predict. But what then of the text of Article 2(1)
of the ICCPR and that annoying “and” in “all individuals within its terri-
tory and subject to its jurisdiction”? I should not be taken for arguing that
the U.S. reading of the text is implausible—far from it, it probably is gram-
matically the most natural. But there are at least two more plausible read-
ings of the text that would open the door to extraterritorial application:
reading the “and” interchangeably with an “or,” and reading the “within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” limitation as being applicable
only to the obligation to ensure human rights, but not to the obligation to
respect them.
The second reading has not received much attention.112 The first, how-
ever, was famously argued by Thomas Buergenthal in a classic 1981 arti-
110. Specifically, an agreement within the meaning of Art. 31(3)(a) VCLT, which would need to be
taken into account when interpreting the treaty.
111. See also Milanovic, supra note 46, at 5.
112. But see John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 72, 124 (2007); Sarah H. Cleve-
land, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 225, 251–253 (2010);
Rolf Ku¨nnemann, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga, eds. 2004) 201, 227–29.
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cle,113 and was subsequently adopted by the Human Rights Committee in
its General Comment No. 31, where it opined that states have the obliga-
tion “to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be
within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.”114 The
ICJ in the Wall case similarly thought that Article 2(1) could be interpreted
both conjunctively and disjunctively, and preferred the latter option.115
One could object to this interpretation as being purely instrumental, but
such an objection cannot be based on the supposed clarity of the text alone.
Even in everyday usage “and” can be used interchangeably with “or” or to
indicate both a conjunction and a disjunction. If I ask you whether you
would like milk and sugar with your coffee, I am not only offering you both
or neither. You will know that my “and” was really an “and/or” not from the
grammatical context or the semantic meaning of the utterance, but from the
social context in which it takes place, i.e. from the fact that plenty of people
drink only milk or only sugar in their coffee, and not just both or neither,
and that it is polite to offer all of these options to one’s guests. Such ambi-
guities are not resolvable on the basis of grammatical interpretation alone.116
Similarly, in legal usage, courts (and lawyers more generally) frequently read
“and” and “or” interchangeably, depending on the context and their ap-
praisal of the intent or purpose of the legislator which can operate at varying
levels of specificity or generality.117
It is precisely this kind of interpretative exercise that we need to engage
in to determine the effect of the “and” in Article 2(1) of the ICCPR. Indeed,
article 31(1) of the VCLT requires us to interpret a treaty “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” At the very least
this means that when we have several plausible readings of a text we should
prefer the one that more accords with the treaty’s object and purpose. And
this is precisely where the universalist normative foundation of human
rights comes in: an interpretation that values all human beings equally and
113. Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in The
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Louis Henkin ed.
1981).
114. General Comment No. 31, supra note 63, para. 10 (emphasis added).
115. Wall, supra note 83, paras. 108, 111 (“This provision can be interpreted as covering only indi-
viduals who are both present within a State’s territory and subject to that State’s jurisdiction. It can also
be construed as covering both individuals present within a State’s territory and those outside that terri-
tory but subject to that State’s jurisdiction. . . . the Court considers that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction
outside its own territory.”).
116. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 223.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. 445, 447 (1865) (“[i]n the construction of statutes, it is
the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often
compelled to construe ‘or’ as meaning ‘and,’ and again ‘and’ as meaning ‘or’”); N.J. Singer, 1A Stat-
utes and Statutory Construction (6th ed., 2002), para. 21:14.
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is respectful of their individual dignity is inherently more preferable than
one that does not.118
Instead of looking at the object and purpose of the ICCPR at a general
level one could also inquire into the intentions of the parties as to the specific
problem of extraterritorial application. Put aside for a moment the fact that
we are actually unable to determine this with much confidence from the
travaux, or the methodological dubiousness of assuming what the text’s
drafters would have wanted if they were to decide a particular hypothetical
problem. I am happy to concede that if we could today resurrect the drafters
of the ICCPR and the ECHR, educate them about emails, the Internet, and
smartphones, and ask them whether their treaties should apply to overseas
espionage and mass surveillance programs of the kind run by the NSA and
GCHQ, their answer would likely be no.
But the appeal of the argument that the representatives of the ICCPR’s
states parties could not possibly have agreed to outlaw foreign surveillance
through the extraterritorial application of the right to privacy is only super-
ficial. Like any presumptive intentionalist argument, it can be easily de-
feated. Surely these same drafters, crafting the Covenant largely in response
to the horrors of the Second World War and the Holocaust, could not have
intended to create a human rights treaty which would not be violated by the
deliberate extermination of a million Jews in Auschwitz.119 Make no mis-
take: this would indeed be the consequence of the absolutist position—that
the ICCPR can never apply extraterritorially, not even to death camps in
Nazi-occupied Poland.
In short, if one thinks that human rights treaties should be interpreted by
establishing (or speculating on) how its drafters intended it or expected it to
apply to specific problems, then one cannot escape what I will call the Au-
schwitz rule of interpretation: that in case there are two plausible interpreta-
tions of the text of a human rights treaty, one should favour that
interpretation under which Auschwitz would be considered a human rights
violation.
Whichever way one turns it, the position that the ICCPR should never
apply extraterritorially seems untenable. It is rendered even more unpersua-
sive by not being supported by any normative theory as to why, exactly,
human rights should categorically stop at the border (or I am yet to see
one).120 This is precisely why the U.S. government is finding its position
increasingly difficult to sustain: it can offer nothing but a formalist invoca-
118. See also Wall, supra note 83, para. 109 (“The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of
States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering
the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural
that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its
provisions.”).
119. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 226.
120. This is not to deny that states may have concerns about the practical difficulties that they may
face in applying human rights treaties beyond their borders. However legitimate these concerns might
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tion of the text itself, regardless of its object and purpose, while pretending
that the text allows no room for ambiguity.
In sum, the ICCPR must apply extraterritorially at least in some situa-
tions—the question is when and how. I will now look at the several possible
models of extraterritorial application. In doing so, I argue that the rules and
principles governing the application of the ICCPR and the ECHR should
broadly be the same, despite the textual differences in the two jurisdiction
clauses.
III. Models of Extraterritorial Application
A. Generally
This part will provide a brief outline of the (often conflicting and confus-
ing) case law on the meaning of the concept of state jurisdiction in human
rights treaties. I will first examine the spatial model of jurisdiction, which
conceptualizes it as effective overall control of an area, then the personal
model of jurisdiction as authority and control over individuals, and finally a
third model that distinguishes between the positive and negative obliga-
tions of states under human rights treaties. Part IV will proceed to apply
these models to several possible factual scenarios of overseas surveillance.
The European Court has produced by far the most case law on extraterri-
torial application, both in quantity and in variety. No case that I am aware
of, however, in the European Court or elsewhere, deals directly with the
question of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties to foreign
searches, interceptions, or surveillance.121 The issue is thus one of first im-
pression. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on the extra-
territorial application of the ICCPR, on the other hand, is not as conflicting
or contradictory, even if it is less varied. The Committee has also tended to
be more generous toward applicants than the European Court. Unless I am
mistaken, there is not a single case in which the Committee rejected the
communication of a person who made an arguable claim that his or her
rights were violated extraterritorially, on the grounds that this person was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the relevant state.122
be, they cannot warrant a categorical rule disallowing extraterritorial application. Rather, they should be
taken into account when looking at the merits of any given case.
121. But see infra notes 189 and 192 and accompanying text.
122. The Committee’s generosity can be explained, in my view, by the fact that it does not necessarily
need to live with the consequences of an expansive approach in the same way as the Strasbourg Court,
where the stakes are higher because of the greater robustness of the regime and the binding nature of the
Court’s decisions.
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B. The Spatial Model
The spatial model of jurisdiction as de facto effective control over areas is
the least controversial. The European Court famously articulated it in the
Loizidou case dealing with Northern Cyprus.123 The Human Rights Com-
mittee similarly applied it to the occupation of the Palestinian territories by
Israel,124 and the ICJ likewise found the ICCPR to apply during occupation
in the Wall125 and Congo v. Uganda cases.126 Under this model, an individual
who is located in a territory under a state’s control (but not necessarily its
sovereignty) has human rights vis-a`-vis that state. This approach makes intui-
tive sense: if a state exercises control over the territory of another state that
in many respects replicates the extent of control that it has over its own
territory, then it is only appropriate for it to have human rights obligations
towards the territory’s inhabitants. As the European Court held in Loizidou,
what matters is the fact of such control, regardless of whether it was ob-
tained lawfully or unlawfully (i.e. in violation of the territorial state’s
sovereignty).127
The benefit of this conception of jurisdiction is its clarity. There will
always be difficult or borderline cases,128 but the test itself is workable and
provides some limits on states’ obligations. But the test’s benefit is also its
123. Loizidou v. Turkey (Judgment), App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 62
(1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920 (“Bearing in
mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise
when as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of
an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through
its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.”).
124. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., 63d Sess., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Par-
ties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations: Israel, Jul. 15-28, 1998, para. 10, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) (“[T]he Covenant must be held applicable to the occupied
territories and those areas . . . where Israel exercises effective control.”); see also Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, 19th Sess., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Under Articles 16 and 17 of
the Covenant: Concluding Observations: Israel, para. 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27 (Dec. 4, 1998)
(“The Committee is of the view that the State’s obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories
and populations under its effective control.”); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 31st Sess., Considera-
tion of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observa-
tions: Israel, paras. 2, 5, 57–58, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.195 (Oct. 4, 2002); Comm. Against Torture,
33d Sess., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention:
Conclusions and Recommendations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Crown
Dependencies and Overseas Territories, Nov. 15–26, 2004, para. 4(b), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec.
10, 2004).
125. Wall, supra note 83.
126. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19).
127. For extended discussions of the spatial model, see, e.g., Ralph Wilde, Triggering State Obligations
Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human Rights Treaties, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 503 (2007).
128. Cf. Catan v. Moldova (Judgment), App. No. 43370/04, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114082; Ilascu v. Moldova (Judgment), App. No.
48787/99, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 392, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-61886 (speaking of a “decisive influence” of Russia over a separatist part of Moldova
as sufficing for jurisdiction).
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drawback, since the spatial model may be too limiting. There are many situa-
tions in which a state is factually perfectly capable of violating the rights of
individuals without controlling the actual area. For example, the whole point
of using drones for targeted killing is that the state does not need to have
troops on the ground. Similarly, the “enhanced interrogation” of high-value
Al-Qaeda detainees after 9/11 was conducted at CIA black sites in third
states, such as Lithuania and Poland, where U.S. agents were using facilities
provided to them by the territorial state.129 The more such cases keep occur-
ring (and there have been plenty), the more morally arbitrary it seems to
condition the state’s obligations on territorial control when such control is
entirely irrelevant to the substance of the violation, and the more unsatisfac-
tory and unappealing the spatial model becomes.
One way of dealing with this problem is to shrink the size of the area that is
the object of the effective overall control test. Northern Cyprus is surely
such an area. But why also not Guantanamo Bay, even though it is much
smaller? There have been a number of cases applying the spatial model to
ever decreasing areas or places such as a British military prison in Iraq,130 or
man-made objects such as ships and aircraft.131
Yet the more one shrinks the size of the area, the more artificial and
arbitrary the whole test seems. For instance, should the application of
human rights treaties really depend on whether state agents control the house
in which an individual was shot to death, a possibility mooted during the
litigation before the English courts in Al-Skeini?132 The more the size of the
area shrinks, the more likely it is that the spatial model collapses into a
conception of jurisdiction as control over individuals, rather than spaces.
129. Cases are currently pending before the European Court against Poland for allowing or failing to
prevent the human rights abuses in the “black sites.” See, e.g., Al Nashiri v. Poland (Judgment), App.
No. 2876/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-146044; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland (Judgment), App. No. 7511/13, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146047.
130. Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 61498/08, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97575.
131. See, e.g., Jamaa v. Italy (Judgment), App. No. 27765/09, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109231; Medvedyev v. France (Judgment), App.
No. 3394/03, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-97979; O¨calan v. Turkey (Judgment), App. No. 46221/99, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69022; Rigopoulos v. Spain (De-
cision), App. No. 37388/97, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-5625; Freda v. Italy (Decision), App. No. 8916/80, 21 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 254
(1980), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74311; see also J.H.A. v.
Spain, Comm. Against Torture, 41st Sess., Nov. 3–21, 2008, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (Nov.
21, 2008), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a939d542.html; Comm. Against Torture, Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: General
Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/47ac78ce2.html.
132. Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Def., para. 110, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [2007] QB 140 (Eng.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/1609.html (referring to this argument as
“sophisticated”—but not in a good way).
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C. The Personal Model
The idea that the word “jurisdiction” in human rights treaties denotes
authority and control exercised by states over individuals, rather than over
territories or areas, also has a long pedigree. This jurisdiction was first set
out by the European Commission in one of the early interstate cases between
Cyprus and Turkey,133 but its biggest proponent has been the Human
Rights Committee. In Lopez-Burgos, a case dealing with an abduction by
Uruguayan agents of an individual on Argentine territory, the Committee
held that:
The reference in article 1 of the Optional Protocol to “individ-
uals subject to its jurisdiction” does not affect the above conclu-
sion because the reference in that article is not to the place where
the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set
forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred. . . . Article 2 (1) of the
Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to
ensure rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction,” but does not imply that the State party con-
cerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under
the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of an-
other State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of
that State or in opposition to it. . . . In line with this, it would be
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of
the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of
the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it
could not perpetrate on its own territory.134
Note how the Committee is essentially making an appeal to the univer-
sality of human rights in order to justify the personal model. The Commit-
tee reiterated this approach in General Comment No. 31, when it held that
“a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant
to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if
not situated within the territory of the State Party . . . regardless of the
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained.”135
So articulated, the principle is broad enough to make any human rights
lawyer happy. But the benefit is again also a drawback, since it seems im-
133. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125, para.
8 (1975), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-74811.
134. Lopez-Burgos, supra note 87, paras. 12.2–12.3 (emphasis added).
135. General Comment No. 31, supra note 63, at para. 10. For similar decisions from the Inter-
American system, see Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures: Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Cuba, 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002); Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, para. 37 (1999); Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 86/99, para. 23 (1999); Saldan˜o v. Argentina P, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
38/99, para. 15–23 (1999).
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possible to limit this principle in a non-arbitrary way. If depriving an indi-
vidual of liberty would constitute “authority and control” or “power and
effective control” over that person, why would depriving that person of life
not also qualify as authority, power, and control?136 Is there any meaningful
difference between detaining a person and then killing him, and just killing
him outright, be that by a missile fired from a drone, in a commando raid
by troops on the ground—as with the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S.
forces in Pakistan—or simply by poison in his soup?137 And if killing an
individual is an exercise of power over him, as it surely must be, why would
not the same apply to destroying their property, or reading his emails?
In other words, applying the personal model consequentially would lead
to human rights treaties governing any extraterritorial state action. While
that may not overly concern the Human Rights Committee (yet), it was
precisely this kind of fear—of possible overreach, lack of institutional com-
petence, and all sorts of practical and political difficulties on the merits—
that in the immediate wake of 9/11 led the European Court to render its
Bankovic´ inadmissibility decision. The case dealt with the destruction of a
TV station in central Belgrade in a NATO airstrike during the 1999 Kosovo
intervention.138 The Bankovic´ Court not only held that the victims of aerial
bombardment were not within the jurisdiction of the NATO states—since
without troops on the ground they lacked effective control over the actual
area despite controlling its airspace—but did so on methodologically dubi-
136. One potential argument for saying that physical custody qualifies as authority and control over
an individual, whereas killing them does not, is that custody allows for a broad spectrum of possible
violations of an individual’s rights, i.e. that the control exercised over the individual is more comprehen-
sive. But while it is undeniably true that custody enables the state to do many different things to the
individual (other than just killing them outright), why should such plenary control be necessary for the
individual to have human rights vis-a`-vis that state? Consider only a scenario in which state X has a
person in custody, but allows the agents of state Y to interrogate and torture that individual. State Y is
only allowed to do to that individual what state X permits it to do, but is it also not true that, by
torturing that individual, state Y is still exercising authority/power/control over that individual to the
sufficient extent that it would have the obligation not to torture him? There seems to be no sound reason
why it should only be state X that should have human rights obligations in such a scenario. We can of
course replace torture in this scenario with any other possible human rights violation (e.g. killing) to
demonstrate that limiting the authority and control principle to physical custody would be arbitrary.
Compare, in that regard, the U.S. Supreme Court’s consideration of the meaning of the word “seizure” in
the Fourth Amendment, which it does not limit only to establishing custody over that individual, but
extends also to the use of lethal force. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“While it is not
always clear just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure . . . there can be no question that
apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.”). The Court was unanimous on this point, see id. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, I agree with the Court that Officer Hymon ‘seized’
Garner by shooting him.”).
137. Compare the case of Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian spy killed in London in November
2006 by radioactive poisoning, ostensibly at the hands of Russian agents. His widow filed an application
against Russia before the European Court, which is still pending. See Strasbourg Court Sets Deadline for
Russia on Litvinenko Case, Ria Novosti (Dec. 15, 2010), http://en.ria.ru/world/20101215/
161786652.html.
138. Bankovic´ v. Belgium (Decision), App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22099.
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ous grounds while studiously ignoring the personal model of jurisdiction. It
moreover explicitly held that the extraterritorial application of the ECHR
can only be exceptional and is an all-or-nothing proposition, as Convention
rights could not be divided and tailored to suit the circumstances of the
particular extraterritorial act in question.139 The reference to the exceptional
nature of extraterritorial application was not to the simple and incontestable
fact that states will generally act far more frequently on their own territory
than outside it. Rather, the Court meant to send a message that it will only
rarely be prepared to accept claims originating in an extraterritorial
context.140
As the criticism of Bankovic´ mounted,141 as its arbitrariness got more and
more exposed in a succession of smaller cases,142 and as the composition of
the Court itself changed, the Court decided to systematically revisit the
question of extraterritorial application in the Al-Skeini case.143 Al-Skeini was
a complex litigation with six applicants, which started in British courts and
dealt with the application of the ECHR to U.K. forces in occupied Iraq. Five
of the applicants were killed by British troops on patrol, in varying circum-
stances. The sixth, Baha Mousa, was detained by British troops and beaten
to death on the premises of a U.K. military prison. The applicants com-
plained of a lack of an effective investigation into the deaths that would be
compliant with Article 2 of the ECHR.
The House of Lords found that the five applicants killed on patrol were
not within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the spa-
tial model of jurisdiction could not apply outside the ECHR’s espace
juridique, the combined territory over which the ECHR’s states parties had
sovereignty, or alternatively because the United Kingdom did not in fact
have effective control over Basra under the spatial model because of the
strength and intensity of the insurgency. Baha Mousa, on the other hand,
was held to be within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction because of the
139. Id. at para. 75.
140. See Wilde, supra note 96, at 670.
141. See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on
Human Rights, 6 Baltic Y.B. Int’l L. 183 (2006); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of
Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L.
529 (2003); Erik Roxstrom, Mark Gibney & Terje Einarsen, The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic´ et al. v.
Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights Protection, 23 B.U. Int’l L.J. 55 (2005).
142. See, e.g., Pad v. Turkey (Decision), App. No. 60167/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-2605; Isaak v. Turkey (Decision), App. No.
44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-77533; Issa v. Turkey (Judgment), App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), availa-
ble at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67460.
143. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105606. Notably, of the 17 judges who sat
on the Al-Skeini Grand Chamber, only three sat on the Bankovic´ Grand Chamber—Costa, Rozakis, and
Casadevall, whereas Judge Costa, presiding over the Al-Skeini Grand Chamber, had also presided over the
2004 Issa Chamber which openly contradicted Bankovic´ while directly invoking the language of the
Human Rights Committee in Lopez-Burgos; see also Issa, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R.
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purported special status of a military prison in international law, akin to
that of an embassy.144
The decision was criticized not only because of its dubious reasoning re-
garding a supposed analogy between prisons and embassies, but also because
of its excessive rigidity and reliance on the espace juridique concept while
largely rejecting the personal model of jurisdiction as inconsistent with
Bankovic´.145 I have similarly argued that the decision is best explained not by
looking at what the House of Lords said, but by understanding that the
universalist imperative which served to protect Baha Mousa, a defenseless
prisoner beaten to death by his captors, did not manage to outweigh the
practical concerns that would be raised by investigations into the patrol kill-
ings during military operations.146
The applicants appealed to the European Court, which took the opportu-
nity to repair some of the damage done by the often-arbitrary distinctions
drawn in its own conflicting case law as well as by the British courts which
had tried faithfully to apply it. The Court reaffirmed the validity both of the
spatial model147 and the personal model as “state agent authority,”148 con-
cluding with regard to the latter that
[i]t is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises
control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction,
the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that
individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Conven-
tion that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this
sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tai-
lored” (compare Bankovic´, cited above, § 75).149
The Court thus not only defined “jurisdiction” as state “control and au-
thority over an individual,” but it also partly overruled (or, in its words,
“compared”) Bankovic´ by allowing for the dividing and tailoring of Conven-
tion rights, as opposed to the all-or-nothing Bankovic´ approach. But the
Court was still aware that if it defined jurisdiction in such terms, then the
Convention would apply everywhere, as again there is no normatively sound,
non-arbitrary way of concluding, for instance, that physical custody qualifies
as “control and authority,” while killing (or the ability to kill) does not.
Indeed, the Court held that the five applicants killed by British troops on
144. Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] A.C. (H.L.) 153 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
145. See, e.g., Tobias Thienel, The ECHR in Iraq: The Judgment of the House of Lords in R (Al-Skeini) v.
Secretary of State for Defence, 6 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 115, 115 (2008); Ralph Wilde, The “Legal Space” or
“Espace Juridique” of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action?,
10 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 115 (2005); Lubell, supra note 84, at 214–15.
146. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 116–17.
147. Al-Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 138–40.
148. Id., paras. 133–37.
149. Id., para. 137.
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patrol in Basra were within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction precisely
because the killing was with authority and control.150 The Court hence felt
compelled to find a limiting principle, and found one in the concept of
“public powers” that it imported from the Bankovic´ analysis of the spatial
model of jurisdiction—the killing of the applicants was thus an exercise of
U.K. jurisdiction, but only because, due to the occupation of Iraq and rele-
vant resolutions of the Security Council, the United Kingdom “assumed
authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in South East
Iraq.”151
In sum, Al-Skeini was a major attempt by the Court at fixing Bankovic´, in
which it was partly successful. But it would still not go all the way. In fact,
it preserved the result of Bankovic´ and by using the nebulous concept of
“public powers” managed to avoid the application of the ECHR to foreign
military interventions simpliciter, as, for example, occurred recently in Libya.
The use of drones in areas not under a state’s control would likewise be
outside the scope of the Convention per Al-Skeini and Bankovic´. The uncer-
tainties of Al-Skeini similarly left the door open for the United Kingdom to
argue that it is confined to the specific facts of Iraq, and that the Convention
largely does not apply to U.K. activities in Afghanistan.152 The lines drawn
by the judgment are better than those in Bankovic´, but they remain arbitrary
and uncertain—Al-Skeini will certainly not be the last word on the
matter.153
D. A Third Model: Positive and Negative Obligations
Just like the spatial model in extremis can collapse into the personal one,
the more the area subject to jurisdiction shrinks in size, so does the personal
model ultimately collapse, and the extraterritorial application of human
rights treaties becomes limitless. The European Court’s attempt to prop it
up through the “public powers” concept may work for a while, but will
increasingly be exposed as unstable.
I have hence argued in favor of a third model which would be based on
the distinction between the overarching positive obligation of states to se-
cure or ensure human rights, which extends even to preventing human
rights violations by third parties, and the negative obligation of states to
respect human rights, which only requires states to refrain from interfering
150. Id., para. 149.
151. Id., paras. 135, 149–50.
152. See Communication from the United Kingdom concerning the case of Al-Skeini and others
against United Kingdom to the Committee of Ministers, (Council of Europe, DH–DD(2012)438 (May 2,
2012), available at https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlob
Get&InstranetImage=2082643&SecMode=1&DocId=1885434&Usage=2 (“The UK considers that
the Al Skeini judgment is set in the factual circumstances of UK’s past operations in Iraq and that it has
no implications for its current operations elsewhere, including in Afghanistan.”).
153. See Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 121 (2012)
(analyzing Al-Skeini in detail).
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with the rights of individuals without sufficient justification.154 Under this
model, “jurisdiction” would primarily mean effective overall control over
areas, and the overarching positive obligation would be predicated on a state
having such control over an area, because in the overwhelming majority of
situations the state actually needs such control in order to be able to comply
with this obligation.
On the other hand, the negative obligation to respect human rights
would be territorially unlimited and not subject to any jurisdictional thresh-
old, because any such threshold that was non-arbitrary would collapse any-
way.155 Textually, this would flow from Article 1 of the ECHR only
referring to the obligation to secure, while Article 2(1) of the ICCPR could
reasonably be read as attaching the jurisdiction threshold only to the obliga-
tion to ensure, but not the obligation to respect.156 Alternatively, negative
obligations could still be subject to the jurisdictional threshold under the
personal model, but as we have seen this threshold actually collapses and the
end result would be the same. The rationale for not limiting negative obli-
gations is that states are always perfectly able to comply with them, since
they remain in full control of their own organs and agents.157
The moral logic of universality is thus brought to its ultimate conclusion,
while jurisdiction still serves as a limiting factor for the normally far more
onerous positive obligations. I am not arguing that this model is perfect,158
but I do claim that it is clear, predictable, precludes the vast majority of
arbitrary outcomes, and provides a relatively stable balance between consid-
erations of universality and effectiveness. Similarly, while I argue that this is
how human rights treaties should be interpreted, I am not claiming that this
is what human rights bodies or courts already are doing. Rather, I am saying
that this model presents an equilibrium toward which the spatial and per-
sonal conceptions of jurisdiction will naturally tend to gravitate.
Having outlined these three models of jurisdiction, I will now proceed to
apply them to several possible scenarios of overseas surveillance.
154. See generally Milanovic, supra note 46, at 209–22.
155. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 101, at 4–5 (similarly relying on the distinction between
the negative obligation to respect and the positive obligation to ensure human rights, but arguing that
the obligation to respect should be limited to individuals subject to the authority and control of a state).
156. See also supra note 112.
157. See Van Schaack, supra note 84, at 49–52.
158. See Marko Milanovic, Reply to Shany, Lowe and Papanicolopulu, EJIL: Talk! (Dec. 5, 2011), http://
www.ejiltalk.org/reply-to-shany-lowe-and-papanicolopulu/. See also Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seri-
ously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law, 7 Law & Ethics
Hum. Rts. 47 (2014).
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IV. Do Human Rights Treaties Apply to Extraterritorial
Interferences with Privacy?
A. Generally
The third model is the only one that provides easy, clear answers to
whether human rights treaties apply to foreign surveillance. If the negative
obligation to respect the right to privacy is territorially unlimited, then any
interference with this right in any place in the world would implicate the
ICCPR or the ECHR. This is not to say that such interferences, whether
through a mass surveillance program or a targeted one, would necessarily be
illegal. Rather, any such interference would need to be substantively justified
within the analytical framework of human rights treaties (i.e. is the interfer-
ence prescribed by law; does it serve a legitimate aim; is it proportionate to
that aim). No threshold question of jurisdiction would arise, and just like
with purely internal surveillance the analysis would need to be one on the
merits. But again, this is also not to say that on the merits internal and
external surveillance would need to be treated equally in every respect.159
The third model may provide a clear answer on the threshold question of
applicability, but it is also one that is very broad and immediately leads to
examination of the merits which carries with it its own uncertainties. This is
precisely why the third model may not be appealing to those actors, be they
governments, secret services, courts, or what have you, who would want to
avoid the difficulties of a merits analysis or the constraints of human rights
treaties altogether.
I will thus proceed to situate the following discussion within the confines
of the more established spatial and personal models. But as soon as I do so,
we will see how we run into uncertainty, complexity, and potential for arbi-
trariness. This is at least partly due to the fact that technological advances in
obtaining information have rendered the exercise of manual, physical power
over individuals unnecessary or at least less necessary. While privacy law in
the information era frequently developed by analogy to old-school physical
searches or interferences, whether in domestic systems (say under the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution)160 or in international human rights
law, there comes a point at which such analogies are no longer feasible or are
outright misleading.
But such analogies can be a useful starting point.161 I will now outline
some scenarios of possible interferences with privacy through searches, inter-
159. See infra Part V.
160. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 949 (2012) (holding that attaching a GPS locator to a
vehicle that enabled the movements of the vehicle to be tracked constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment, thus requiring a warrant); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use
of an infrared thermal imaging device outside a house in order to detect lamps for growing marijuana
within the house was a search for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment).
161. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (2005).
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ception, or surveillance, starting with the more physical and ending with
the most virtual. Under existing case law all of these actions by state agents
against individuals could in principle count as interferences with their pri-
vacy rights under either the ECHR or the ICCPR if these actions were to
occur on the state’s own territory. The problem I want to address is jurisdic-
tion: whether human rights treaties would apply in the first place if the state
engaged in such conduct extraterritorially under either the spatial or the
personal model, and whether distinctions should be made in terms of juris-
diction between the physical and the virtual methods of gathering
information.
The scenarios include:
(1) Physical search of a person.
(2) Physical search of a person’s property, or residence.
(3) Physical access to a person’s computer system, phone, or an electronic
telecommunications or data storage device.162
(4) Physical interference with a person’s correspondence with another in-
dividual without the exercise of physical coercion against either indi-
vidual (e.g. the opening and copying of a person’s mail at the post
office).163
(5) Audio-visual surveillance of a person.
(6) Audio-visual surveillance of a person’s property or residence.
(7) Remote access to a person’s computer system, phone, or electronic
telecommunications or data storage device.164
162. Physically accessing a computer might at first glance seem a bit quaint. Note, however, that the
most sensitive information held by governments and private enterprises is stored on computers not con-
nected to the Internet, or to any internal network, precisely because of fears that such computers could be
hacked and accessed remotely. Consider, in that regard, reports that the NSA has developed methods of
accessing such “air-gapped” computers: “The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008,
relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards
inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station
that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target. . . . In most cases, the radio frequency
hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.” See David E. Sanger
& Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html?hp&
_r=0. The NSA’s TAO unit is reported to be frequently deployed to the field, unlike most NSA opera-
tions, since its “ventures often require physical access to their targets.” Inside TAO: Documents Reveal Top
NSA Hacking Unit, Spiegel Online (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:18 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html; see also Jacob
Appelbaum, Judith Horchert & Christian Sto¨cker, Shopping for Spy Gear: Catalog Advertises NSA Toolbox,
Spiegel Online (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-
nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html (reporting on a variety of NSA hardware used
to collect data from compromised computers, including rigged keyboards which log all keystrokes even
without an Internet connection, and monitor cables which transmit images shown on the monitor).
163. Similarly, in a combination of scenarios (3) and (4), the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations
(TAO) unit is reported to engage in a program called “interdiction,” which intercepts and diverts parcels
of targeted parties, e.g. orders for new computers or accessories, in order to load malware onto them or
install hardware components that would enable surveillance. See Inside Tao, supra note 162.
164. See, e.g., NSA Can Spy on Offline Computers Wirelessly, Says Security Expert, CBS News (Dec. 30,
2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-can-spy-on-offline-computers-wirelessly-expert-jacob-apple-
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(8) Interception of electronic communication midstream, without di-
rectly accessing the computer systems, phone, or other telecommuni-
cations devices of either the sender or the receiver.165
(9) Collection of metadata about the communication, rather than the
content of the communication.
(10) Collection, storage, processing, transfer, and use of any other kind of
personal data.166
Let us now try to apply the spatial and personal models of jurisdiction to
some of these scenarios.
B. Spatial Model: Individual in an Area under the State’s Control
The application of the spatial model would be straightforward in princi-
ple. If an individual is located in an area under the state’s control and the
individual’s privacy is interfered with by the agents of the state, the ICCPR
and the ECHR would clearly apply. Thus, if Angela Merkel were in New
York City visiting the United Nations, and a CIA agent searched her hotel
room,167 physically tampered with her phone or computer, or intercepted
her communications remotely,168 she would be subject to U.S. jurisdiction
baum-says/ (reporting inter alia on how malware uploaded onto an iPhone can allow remote access and
turn it into a surveillance device); Quantum Spying: GCHQ Used Fake LinkedIn Pages to Target Engineers,
Spiegel Online (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ghcq-targets-engineers-
with-fake-linkedin-pages-a-932821.html (reporting on how the NSA and GCHQ can use fake LinkedIn
pages to upload malware onto a target computer).
165. See, e.g., NSA Collects Millions of Text Messages Daily in “Untargeted” Global Sweep, The Guardian
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-
daily-untargeted-global-sweep (reporting on how the NSA’s Dishfire program collects almost 200 mil-
lion text messages daily from across the globe, and in addition to their contents extracts contacts, geolo-
cational and financial information); Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo,
Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, Wash. Post (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-world-
wide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html (re-
porting on how the NSA’s and GCHQ’s joint MUSCULAR program allows them to collect at will
content and metadata from hundreds of millions Google and Yahoo accounts).
166. The methods for acquiring such data are many and varied. See, e.g., James Ball, Angry Birds and
“Leaky” Phone Apps Targeted by NSA and GCHQ for User Data, The Guardian (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:51 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
(reporting on how vulnerable apps can be exploited to acquire personal data such as age, gender, ethnic-
ity, location and sexual orientation, and quoting a leaked official document to the effect that “anyone
using Google Maps on a smartphone is working in support of a GCHQ system”).
167. It has been reported that GCHQ’s “royal concierge” program is able to automatically identify
and track potential hotel reservations for diplomats, so as to leave enough time to make the necessary
technical preparations if the person in question is a valuable surveillance target so that the hotel room, its
phone lines, and network can be bugged. See Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, “Royal
Concierge”: GCHQ Monitors Hotel Reservations to Track Diplomats, Spiegel Online (Nov. 17, 2013), http://
www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.
html.
168. See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ Intercepted Foreign Politicians’ Communications at G20 Sum-
mits, The Guardian (June 17, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/16/gchq-intercepted-
communications-g20-summits (“Foreign politicians and officials who took part in two G20 summit
meetings in London in 2009 had their computers monitored and their phone calls intercepted on the
instructions of their British government hosts, according to documents seen by the Guardian. Some
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under the spatial model and her privacy would be protected by the ICCPR
(again, this does not mean that the surveillance would necessarily be unlaw-
ful, but that it would have to be justified in order to be lawful). Note also
that for the spatial model it is control over territory alone, and not title that
matters—the result of this inquiry would be the same if Merkel were visit-
ing Iraq while it was under U.S. occupation and the CIA did its business
there.169
When in control of territory, states also have the positive obligation to
secure or ensure human rights and protect individuals within their jurisdic-
tion from human rights violations by third parties.170 In the surveillance
context this obligation would have two main components. First, states
would need to regulate private companies operating in areas under control
that collect, store, process, or have access to personal data.171 This would
include, but not necessarily be limited to, basic standards on data protec-
tion. Second, states would need to exercise due diligence and undertake all
effective measures reasonably available to them to prevent interferences with
privacy by third parties. If, for example, France knew that a third state was
intercepting the communications of individuals living in France on a mas-
sive scale, and if such interferences were objectively unjustified under the
framework of human rights law, France would need to implement such tech-
nological and other measures that are at its disposal to obstruct these inter-
ferences—for instance mandating the use of encryption when transmitting
personal data.172
A more difficult problem arises if a state engages in surveillance of its
own population and then provides the information it collected to a third
party. The “Five Eyes” states share signals intelligence and the data they
collect with one another, although the specifics are of course unclear.173 The
delegates were tricked into using internet cafes which had been set up by British intelligence agencies to
read their email traffic.”).
169. See generally Loizidou v. Turkey (Judgment), App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1995); Milanovic, supra note 46, at 58–61.
170. Cf. G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 16, para. 4; supra note 19 and accompanying text.
171. This is again a relatively straightforward application of the spatial model – what the regulation
would entail in practice is of course a fact-specific question for the merits. A more difficult problem in
jurisdictional terms is whether states would have such positive obligations toward individuals whose data
is stored or processed in a facility located in a territory under the state’s control, but the individual
himself is not. That scenario would not seem to be covered by the spatial model, which requires individ-
uals to be within areas under the state’s jurisdiction.
172. See Anne Peters, Surveillance without Borders: The Unlawfulness of the NSA Panopticon, Part II, EJIL:
Talk! (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/surveillance-without-borders-the-unlawfulness-of-the-nsa-
panopticon-part-ii//.
173. See, e.g., Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. Times (Nov. 2,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-
nsa.html?pagewanted=4&_r=0 (“For decades, the N.S.A. has shared eavesdropping duties with the rest
of the so-called Five Eyes, the Sigint agencies of Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. More
limited cooperation occurs with many more countries, including formal arrangements called Nine Eyes
and 14 Eyes and Nacsi, an alliance of the agencies of 26 NATO countries.”); Arne Halvorsen et al.,
Norway’s Secret Surveillance of Russian Politics for the NSA, Dagbladet (Dec. 17, 2013), http://
www.dagbladet.no/2013/12/17/nyheter/samfunn/politikk/utenriks/overvaking/30877258/.
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individuals concerned could be within the jurisdiction of the collecting/
sending state, but not necessarily under the jurisdiction of the receiving
state, at least not under the spatial model. Various other complicity scena-
rios are possible,174 but they introduce further legal and factual complexities
that I am not able to explore in this article, other than by saying that such
scenarios can implicate both the secondary rules of state responsibility under
general international law175 and specific primary rules of international
human rights law which may set limits on information-sharing.176
C. Spatial Model: Interference in an Area Under the State’s Control
New technologies can today frequently lead to a disconnect between the
location of the individual and the location of the interference with the individ-
ual’s privacy.177 For example, while sitting in her office in Berlin, Angela
Merkel can send an email to somebody in Australia but the communication
itself can be routed through a server in the United Kingdom and intercepted
there by the U.K. authorities. Merkel is thus located in Germany, but the
actual interference with her privacy takes place in the United Kingdom.
The question is how to determine state jurisdiction in situations in which
the interference was done in an area under a state’s control, but the individ-
ual is not in any such area. Should we look at such cases under the spatial
model, on the basis of the location of the interference, or under the personal
model, by seeing whether the interception as such qualifies as an exercise of
authority and control over the individual?
At a textual and conceptual level I am skeptical that the spatial model
could be applied on the basis of the location of the interference alone. If the
174. See, e.g., James Ball, US and UK Struck Secret Deal to Allow NSA to “Unmask” Britons’ Personal
Data, The Guardian (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/20/us-uk-secret-
deal-surveillance-personal-data (reporting on the UK allowing the US to “unmask” the personal data of
UK residents that was collected by the NSA, but was previously subject to minimization procedures);
Ewen MacAskill, James Ball & Katharine Murphy, Revealed: Australian Spy Agency Offered to Share Data
About Ordinary Citizens, The Guardian (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/
02/revealed-australian-spy-agency-offered-to-share-data-about-ordinary-citizens (reporting on Australia
sharing un-minimized personal data of ordinary Australians with the NSA); Greg Weston, Glenn Green-
wald & Ryan Gallagher, New Snowden Docs Show U.S. Spied During G20 in Toronto, CBC News (Nov. 27,
2013),  http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-
1.2442448 (reporting on Canada allowing the United States to conduct surveillance operations on its
territory during a G20 summit in Toronto).
175. See Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article
16, U.N. Doc. A/56/49; GAOR, 56th Sess. (2001).
176. For example, by saying that states have a territorially unlimited negative obligation to refrain
from conduct that would assist third parties in violating the right to privacy, e.g. by analogy to the non-
refoulement rule in cases such as Soering v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57619,  or
Judge v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm’cn No. 829/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/
1998 (2003).
177. See Carly Nast, Interference-Based Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Right to Privacy, EJIL: Talk!
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/interference-based-jurisdiction-over-violations-of-the-right-to-
privacy/.
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inquiry is whether the individual is within or subject to a state’s jurisdic-
tion, and if “jurisdiction” means an area under the state’s effective control,
it is hard to see why the location of the interference should matter.178 But
our intuitions, on the other hand, do seem to favour the application of human
rights treaties in such circumstances. For example, I normally live and work
in the United Kingdom, but I travel relatively frequently. If the U.K. police
searched my flat in Nottingham or if they hacked into my office computer
while I was out of the country, surely the ICCPR and the ECHR would
apply and my privacy rights would be engaged? If they seized my U.K.
bank account while I was outside the United Kingdom, surely my property
rights under Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR would be engaged? And so forth.
There have been plenty of cases before the European Court or the Human
Rights Committee with such an extraterritorial element in which everyone,
including the respondent state, simply took for granted that the treaty ap-
plied.179 Nobody ever doubted, for instance, that Article 6 of the ECHR fair
trial rights applied to a person who was tried in absentia but who absconded to
another state’s territory while the trial went on.180 The Court similarly found
Article 6 to apply to civil proceedings brought in Italy by claimants living
in Serbia for damages arising from the destruction of the same Belgrade TV
station that was at issue in Bankovic.181 Indeed, it would seem manifestly
arbitrary for the Convention not to apply. If that is so, why should privacy
rights be any different? The question, then, is what theory covers these kinds
of situations.
The first option is to treat such situations under the spatial model, but as
I have explained above, that is problematic because the focus of that model
is on the location of the individual rather than on the location of the inter-
ference. The second is to examine them under the personal model. But if we
accept that, for example, I am an individual under the “authority and con-
trol” of the United Kingdom when U.K. agents search my flat in Notting-
ham even when I am outside the country, I do not see how we could deny
178. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 7–8.
179. See, e.g., Gueye v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 196/1985, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (Apr. 6, 1989) (Art. 26 ICCPR applied to former French Army servicemen of
Senegalese nationality residing in Senegal, whose French pensions were reduced solely on grounds of
nationality); Bosphorus v. Ireland (Judgment), App. No. 45036/98, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69564 (Convention applies to the im-
pounding of an aircraft in Ireland that was leased by a company incorporated in Turkey); Mullai v.
Albania (Judgment), App. No. 9074/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107030 (property rights under the Convention regarding a building
permit dispute in Albania, even though some of the applicants were not physically located in Albania);
Vrbica v. Croatia (Judgment), App. No. 32540/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98057 (applicant’s fair trial rights were engaged
regarding the recognition and enforcement of a judgment by a Montenegrin court in Croatia, even
though he never lived in Croatia).
180. See Sejdovic v. Italy (Judgment), App. No. 56581/00, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-72629.
181. See Markovic v. Italy (Judgment), App. No. 1398/03, 2006-XIV Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-78623.
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that I would also be under the authority and control of the United Kingdom
if U.K. agents surreptitiously searched my flat in Belgrade, Serbia. Simi-
larly, if the ECHR would apply to a search of my desktop computer in the
United Kingdom even while I am in Serbia, because in performing this
search the U.K. government is exercising authority and control over me,
then I do not see why the ECHR would not apply to a similar search of my
laptop by U.K. agents operating in Serbia, whether lawfully or unlawfully.
In other words, the location of both the individual and the interference
seems to be irrelevant under the logic of the personal model.
A third option would be to say that what we have here are territorial acts
producing extraterritorial effects, a line of thinking going back to the Stras-
bourg Drozd and Janousek case.182 But that is not, in my view, a sound way of
conceptualizing the application of human rights treaties since in every case
one can draw some kind of causal link between a territorial act (e.g. the
decision to bomb Serbia in 1999 made by NATO governments in their own
territories) and extraterritorial consequences (e.g. the bombing itself). The
European Court for its parts sees Drozd in the context of the personal model
only.183 Moreover in cases of surveillance the possible violation of privacy is
entirely consummated by the act of surveillance itself, whether it takes place
in an area under the state’s sovereignty, control, or beyond its control. My
own preferred solution to such cases is hence the third model of jurisdiction
that distinguishes between positive and negative obligations. The reason
why the Convention would apply is because it should apply to all potential
violations of negative obligations, e.g. the one to refrain from interfering
with my privacy.
Whatever theory one chooses, surveillance programs in which the inter-
ference with privacy takes place within an area under the state’s control,
even though the individual is not located in this area, may be more open to
challenge than those programs in which both the interference and the indi-
vidual are outside areas controlled by the state. For example, GCHQ’s mas-
sive Tempora program taps transatlantic fibre-optic cables as they pass
through the United Kingdom or its territorial sea and obtains enormous
amounts of data.184 The interference hence takes place within the United
Kingdom even though the person whose communication is intercepted is
located outside it. And even if the interception of communication or the
collection of personal data does not take place in an area under the state’s
182. See Drozd v. France (Judgment), App. No. 12747/87, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 91
(1992), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57774 (holding that
“[t]he term ‘jurisdiction’ is not limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties; their
responsibility can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own
territory”).
183. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras.
133, 135.
184. See Ewn MacAskill et al., GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications,
The Guardian (June 21, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-
world-communications-nsa.
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control, its subsequent storage, processing and use—all of which would con-
stitute separate, fresh interferences with privacy—may well take place
within such an area.185 Similarly, Australia is reported to have been using its
embassies in a number of countries to intercept calls and data, equipping
them with surveillance collection facilities, as part of the STATEROOM
program of using diplomatic missions of the “Five Eyes” states.186 The
United States has also routinely used its embassies and overseas military
bases for electronic surveillance.187 Recall, in that regard, the possibility of
shrinking the spatial model of jurisdiction to cover smaller areas or places, as
in Al-Saadoon, including embassies and military bases.188
Notably, at least two surveillance/data collection cases before the Euro-
pean Court dealt with situations in which the interference was territorial
while the individual was outside any area under the state’s control. In the
first, Weber and Saravia v. Germany,189 the applicants lived in Uruguay while
their communication was allegedly intercepted in Germany. Germany actu-
ally even objected that the case was outside its jurisdiction under
Bankovic,190 but the Court avoided the matter and dismissed the case as
manifestly ill-founded on the merits.191 In the second, Liberty and Others v.
the United Kingdom,192 two of the applicants were Irish organizations that
communicated with a British one, and their communication was allegedly
intercepted in the United Kingdom. Neither the U.K. government nor the
Court proprio motu considered that an Article 1 jurisdiction issue arose with
respect to the Irish applicants—that is, they both assumed that the ECHR
applied, and the Court went on to find a violation of Article 8.
D. Personal Model
The most problematic situation of surveillance is one where both the in-
dividual and the interference with their privacy take place in an area outside
the state’s control. Unless we opt for the third model which distinguishes
between positive and negative obligations, we will have to look at such cases
through the personal model of jurisdiction. We have seen how the case law
185. See discussion infra Part V for what constitutes an interference with privacy.
186. See Australia Accused of Using Embassies to Spy on Neighbours, The Guardian (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/31/australia-accused-embassies-spy-neighbours.
187. See, e.g., Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, Spiegel Online (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-
berlin-embassy-a-930205.html (reporting on the use by NSA Special Collection Service operatives of US
embassies and consulates in Berlin, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Prague and Geneva); Inside TAO, supra note 162
(reporting on the use of a US military base in Darmstadt).
188. See Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 61498/08, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R.
189. Weber v. Germany (Decision), App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-76586.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Liberty v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87207.
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of the European Court and the Human Rights Committee defines such ju-
risdiction in similar terms, as “authority and control” or “power and effec-
tive control” over individuals. The question is what exactly qualifies as such
authority, power, or control, and how these criteria would apply to overseas
surveillance. As a thought experiment, consider the following scenarios, all
of which for the sake of the argument take place in Berlin and involve a
hypothetical Angela Merkel:
(1) A CIA agent grabs Angela Merkel, disables her escort (assume he is
some kind of judo master), and then physically searches her for items
in her possession.
(2) A CIA agent breaks into and searches Angela’s apartment and plants
cameras and listening devices.
(3) A CIA agent manages to get Angela’s phone when she is not looking,
and furtively plants a tracking device in it.
(4) A CIA agent breaks into Angela’s office and hacks into her computer,
uploading a virus and downloading sensitive data.
(5) A CIA agent observes and listens to Angela using a high-resolution
camera/directed mike.
(6) A CIA agent observes and monitors Angela’s residence from the
outside using a high-resolution camera/directed mike, without neces-
sarily observing Angela herself.
(7) A CIA agent hacks Angela’s phone or computer remotely.
(8) A CIA agent intercepts Angela’s calls, texts, or emails midstream.
(9) A CIA agent is able to collect information about whom Angela calls,
when, for how long (telephony metadata) or whom and when she
emails (internet metadata).
(10) The NSA obtains Angela’s personal information from its partners in
GCHQ, and proceeds to store and process that information.
Which of these scenarios qualify as an exercise of authority, power, or con-
trol over Angela? As I explained before, the personal model of jurisdiction is
prone to collapse (and that may be either a bug or a feature, depending on
your point of view). It is very difficult to draw lines that are not arbitrary.
Indeed, some lines clearly would be arbitrary, for instance if we said that in
any of these scenarios Angela would be under U.S. jurisdiction but only if
she was a U.S. citizen.193
193. See supra Part I; see also Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, para. 37 (1999) (“Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue
of a person’s humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person
subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons within a state’s territory, it may,
under given circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is
present in the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state—usually through the acts
of the latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence
within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the
rights of a person subject to its authority and control.”) (emphasis added).
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Of these ten scenarios, only (1) involves the exercise of physical power
against Angela herself in the sense of an agent handling her bodily. (2)-(4)
all involve the exercise of physical power, but against Angela’s property
rather than her person. (5) and (6) are physical but non-corporeal, as it were.
(7)-(10) are entirely virtual or digital.194
I see no legitimate way of drawing lines here. Scenario (1) surely must
qualify as an exercise of power, authority or control over Angela, who is held
and searched against her will by a state agent. But if (1) equals jurisdiction,
then why not (2)-(4), et cetera? In particular, if virtual methods can in prin-
ciple accomplish the exact same result as physical ones, then there seems to
be no valid reason to treat them differently and insist on some kind of direct
corporeal intervention.195 Therefore, unless one is willing to knowingly draw
lines that are arbitrary and by very their nature invite evasion and abuse, for
instance, by requiring such direct physical intervention or by using a nebu-
lous and undefined criterion such as the Bankovic/Al-Skeini concept of “pub-
lic powers,” the personal model would again seem to collapse and all cases of
overseas surveillance by a state would be within the state’s jurisdiction. The
end result would ultimately be no different than if we applied my third
model from the outset and dispensed with any jurisdictional inquiry with
regard to possible violations of states’ negative obligations.
In sum, I submit that human rights treaties apply to most, if not all,
foreign surveillance activities. This would certainly be the case under the
third model of jurisdiction, and would equally be true of the personal model
if it is applied consistently and coherently. But the European Court may
well decide to draw an arbitrary line somewhere, especially because whatever
it decides in the context of extraterritorial privacy violations will necessarily
have ramifications for other controversial issues, such as targeted killings
(e.g. there seems no way of saying that reading Angela’s email is an exercise
of power, authority, and control over her, but that killing her is not). Even
though I have argued what the Court should do, it is impossible to predict
what the Court will in fact do, except to say that it is more likely to find
interferences with privacy that occur within a territory controlled by the
state (e.g. the GCHQ Tempora program) to be covered by the Convention.
The Human Rights Committee’s track record, on the other hand, suggests
that it will be more generous than the European Court, even if its views may
prove to have less of an impact. From an advocacy standpoint, clear state-
ments by the Committee and the U.N. special rapporteurs with relevant
mandates to the effect that human rights treaties apply to extraterritorial
surveillance will make it more likely for the European Court (or the U.K.
194. Note that all of these methods are physical in a wider sense—the transmission and sensation of
images via photons, or of sounds via vibrations of particles in the air, or of information via electrons are
physical phenomena no less than the interaction between the atoms of the CIA agent’s hands and those of
Merkel’s body.
195. See Margulies, supra note 84, at 11–13 (arguing for a concept of virtual control).
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Supreme Court or the highest court of some other party in which human
rights treaties are directly applicable, or even the ICJ if a pertinent case were
to come before it) to find such an approach palatable.
I will now look at what the right to privacy might mean in the extraterri-
torial surveillance context, assuming that the ICCPR and the ECHR apply.
V. The Substance of an Extraterritorial Right to Privacy
A. Between Utopia and Apology, Universality and Effectiveness
Until now I have only addressed the threshold question of whether indi-
viduals subject to surveillance overseas should be entitled to human rights
in the first place. This part of the article will deal with the substance of the
right to privacy in this context, if the right is found to apply. Though my
main focus has been on the threshold question of extraterritorial application,
and though that question is conceptually distinct from the substantive con-
tent of any given right, there is a direct connection as a matter of policy
between the inquiries on jurisdiction and on the merits. The more difficult,
complex, or politically controversial the merits question of whether the sub-
stantive right has been violated, the greater the temptation to say that the
right simply does not apply. Courts in particular frequently resort to dis-
missing cases in limine even while furtively casting an eye on the merits, in
order to avoid grappling with the merits openly. One cannot really reduce
arbitrariness in resolving threshold questions without looking at what the
consequences of doing so would be down the line.
I have argued in that regard that the case law on the extraterritorial appli-
cation of human rights treaties, particularly that of the European Court,
straddles a Koskenniemian divide between universality and effectiveness.196
On one hand we want to follow the moral logic of universality, protect
human beings no matter where they are located on the basis of their inher-
ent dignity, and just do the right thing. On the other, we see the enormous
practical and political difficulties of doing so, that doing the right thing
often comes at a cost, and that complying with universality could require a
radical departure from the status quo. An expansive approach to extraterrito-
riality can thus be criticized as utopian, as presenting a normative vision
which has nothing to do with the real world, whereas a restrictive approach
can be dismissed as pure apology for unbridled, arbitrary, and limitless exer-
cise of state power which we would never accept domestically.
A persuasive argument regarding the threshold of extraterritorial applica-
tion hence must also look at the substance and attempt to strike a better
balance between universality and effectiveness. It must provide states and
courts with sufficient flexibility in the extraterritorial context and not impose
196. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 106–17 (relying on Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology
to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2005)).
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unrealistic burdens and restrictions with which they could never comply.
Resistance to extraterritorial application flows in large part from the fact
that most human rights case law was built in times of normalcy, and the fear
that applying this case law to external situations would be rigid and inflexi-
ble. It is this fear that leads to categorical rejections of the possibility that
human rights treaties can apply extraterritorially, or to the drawing of arbi-
trary lines on threshold jurisdictional issues. However, while real, this fear is
overstated. Most human rights, including privacy, analytically employ bal-
ancing tests that can be used less strictly if this is objectively justified by the
circumstances—but such a justification must be made out and evaluated on
its merits.197
Compare, in that regard, the inherent malleability of balancing tests with
the U.S. Fourth Amendment’s categorical warrant requirement for searches
and seizures. While the European Court has interpreted the notions of “pri-
vate life” and “correspondence” that are protected by the Convention very
generously, thereby increasing the scope of acts that can constitute an inter-
ference with privacy,198 the U.S. Supreme Court has at times interpreted the
concept of a search or seizure quite narrowly, because this was the only way
of avoiding what appeared as an inflexible, overly rigid requirement for a
specific search warrant on probable cause.199 In other words, the scope of the
right to privacy under the ECHR (and arguably the ICCPR) is wider than
the current state of the U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on “reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.”200 For instance, while the Supreme Court held in Smith v.
Maryland that individuals had no reasonable expectation of privacy in te-
lephony metadata,201 such metadata would be within the scope of the human
right to privacy, even if collecting this metadata would not necessarily re-
quire a warrant.202
197. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 110–13.
198. See, e.g., Shimovolos v. Russai (Judgment), App. No. 30194/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 64 (2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105217 (“The Court reiterates
that private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. Article 8 is not limited to the
protection of an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to
exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. It also protects the
right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. Private life
may even include activities of a professional or business nature. . . . There is, therefore, a zone of interac-
tion of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life.’”)
(citing relevant case law).
199. See Elisabet Fura & Mark Klamberg, The Chilling Effect of Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Electronic Surveillance Laws in Europe and the USA, in Freedom of Expression – Essays in
Honour of Nicolas Bratza 463 (Josep Casadevall et al., eds., 2012).
200. The test for what constitutes a search in a constitutionally protected context, originating in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (2007) (discussing the inability of the
Supreme Court to provide a single, consistent answer on the nature of a search under the Fourth
Amendment).
201. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
202. See Malone v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para.
84 (1984), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-5753 (“As the Gov-
ernment rightly suggested, a meter check printer registers information that a supplier of a telephone
132 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
The human rights framework is hence inherently flexible when it comes
to justifying interferences with privacy, while simultaneously being very in-
clusive on what constitutes such interference.203 But even though the human
rights framework can and could be applied even more flexibly in the external
context, it must not be applied so flexibly that it ceases to have any impact or
compromises the integrity of the whole regime.204 By impact I mean that
there would be no point in applying human rights extraterritorially if they
brought nothing new to the table, if they made no difference whatsoever and
did not in any way challenge the status quo. On the contrary, watering
down the substantive requirements of human rights too much in the exter-
nal as opposed to the internal context would only serve to legitimize the
status quo, and thereby enhance the apology critique. In that sense, while
governments run the risk that their current arrangements in conducting for-
eign surveillance would be deemed to be unjustified within the human
rights framework, privacy activists also run the risk that these arrange-
ments—perhaps with some minor changes here or there—would actually be
found to be acceptable within that very same framework, especially if the
relevant courts or treaty bodies conducted their review very deferentially.205
Finally, we must produce rules that are reasonably clear and predictable,
both with regard to the threshold question of applicability and with regard
to the merits. This is precisely what I have tried to do with my third model
of jurisdiction when it comes to applicability, while the merits inquiry is
necessarily more fact-specific and can be outlined in the abstract only in very
broad strokes, which I will now (quite briefly) do.
service may in principle legitimately obtain, notably in order to ensure that the subscriber is correctly
charged or to investigate complaints or possible abuses of the service. By its very nature, metering is
therefore to be distinguished from interception of communications, which is undesirable and illegitimate
in a democratic society unless justified. The Court does not accept, however, that the use of data obtained
from metering, whatever the circumstances and purposes, cannot give rise to an issue under Article 8
(art. 8). The records of metering contain information, in particular the numbers dialled, which is an
integral element in the communications made by telephone. Consequently, release of that information to
the police without the consent of the subscriber also amounts, in the opinion of the Court, to an interfer-
ence with a right guaranteed by Article 8 (art. 8).”). The Court went on to hold that the interference
constituted a violation of Article 8 because it was not “in accordance with the law” in the sense of Article
8(2). Id., paras. 86–88.
203. Note that two U.S. Courts of Appeals have tried to avoid the rigidity of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement by holding that in an extraterritorial context even a citizen would only be
entitled to a reduced, core reasonableness protection under the Fourth Amendment, which would (like
human rights law) not necessarily require a warrant. See United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir.
2013); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008).
204. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 113–15.
205. See also Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 434
(2008) (arguing that in the U.S. context there are systemic problems in applying balancing tests so that
the importance of security interests is inflated while the value of liberty interests is diminished, and that
the lack of transparency about data mining programs compromises any balancing exercise regarding their
justifiability).
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B. Privacy and Surveillance within the Human Rights Framework
At this point we should recall some of the textual differences between the
ICCPR and the ECHR with respect to the right to privacy. Article 17 of the
ICCPR prohibits “arbitrary or unlawful” interferences with privacy or corre-
spondence, while under Article 8 of the ECHR interferences with privacy or
correspondence can only be justified if they are “in accordance with the law”
and “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the legiti-
mate goals specified therein, such as national security. Both provisions are
vague, broad in scope, and require interpretation. The words “unlawful”
and “in accordance with the law” refer to the legality of the interference,
e.g. surveillance measures, under the relevant state’s own domestic law. The
“arbitrary” standard in the ICCPR, on the other hand, at least prima facie
appears more lenient than the “necessary in a democratic society” ECHR
standard.
But the Human Rights Committee has never read “arbitrary” in Article
17 or other provisions of the Covenant that use it by its purely discretionary
meaning,206 as referring to unrestrained decisions made purely by discretion
or on whim, without any rational reason—a standard so low that it could be
satisfied by having almost any rule allowing for the interference.207 Nor has
the European Court read “necessary in a democratic society” to require abso-
lute necessity in the sense of always requiring the exhaustion of all possible,
less intrusive means capable of achieving the same end, since that would put
an unreasonable burden on states which are in most situations faced with
many alternatives and trade-offs and the choice between them is subject to
the political process.208 Rather, both bodies have adopted a virtually identi-
cal analytical approach in assessing whether there has been a violation of the
right to privacy, in a four-part test:
(1) Has there been an interference with privacy or correspondence?
(2) If so, was the interference lawful/in accordance with the law?
(3) If so, did the interference pursue a legitimate aim?
(4) If so, was it proportionate to that aim?
206. See ICCPR, art. 6.1, 9.1, 12.4.
207. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 16: Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
at 21 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 16]; see also Donoso v. Panama´ (Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., para. 56 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_193
_ing.pdf (holding that “right to privacy is not an absolute one, and, so, it may be restricted by the States
provided that their interference is not abusive or arbitrary; accordingly, such restriction must be statuto-
rily enacted, serve a legitimate purpose, and meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and propor-
tionality which render it necessary in a democratic society”).
208. Such absolute necessity is used only in the context of Article 2 of the ECHR and deprivation of
life. This has similarly been the approach of the Human Rights Committee, even though Article 6(1) of
the ICCPR also prohibits only arbitrary deprivations of the right to life—the intensity of the proportion-
ality analysis will inevitably be higher in the right to life than in the right to privacy contexts.
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With regard to (1), as explained above human rights bodies have taken an
expansive view as to what constitutes an interference with privacy. This
would not be limited merely to the interception of the content of a commu-
nication, but also to the collection of metadata about the communication,209
audio-visual observation,210 GPS tracking,211 as well as to the storing and
use of personal information.212 Telephone, facsimile, and email communica-
tions would be covered by notions of privacy and correspondence, as would
other similar forms of telecommunication, e.g. voice or video calls or chats
over the Internet.213 Moreover, “the transmission of data to and their use by
other authorities, which enlarges the group of persons with knowledge of
the personal data intercepted and can lead to investigations being instituted
against the persons concerned, constitutes a further separate interference.”214
A violation is conceivable even in the absence of any detriment to the af-
fected individual.215 Finally,
[T]he mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the
secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveil-
lance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied. This
threat necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between
users of the telecommunications services and thereby amounts in
itself to an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ rights
under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually taken
against them.216
Question (2) has been of particular importance in the surveillance context.
This is so because human rights bodies do not merely require surveillance
measures to have a basis in and be lawful under the domestic law of the state
concerned, but also for that law to possess certain interrelated qualities and
satisfy the autonomous meaning of lawfulness under human rights treaties:
209. Malone v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 84
(1984).
210. El Haski c. Belgique [El-Haski v. Belgium] (Judgment), App. No. 649/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. para.
102 (2012) (in French), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113336.
211. Uzun v. Germany (Judgment), App. No. 35623/05, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 12–13, available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100293; see also supra note 160.
212. See S. v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.
paras. 20, 33, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90051; Amann v.
Switzerland (Judgment), App. No. 27798/95, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 69, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58497; Leander v. Sweden (Judgment), App. No.
9248/81, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1987), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-57519.
213. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), availa-
ble at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98473; Liberty v. United Kingdom
(Judgment), App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
214. Weber v. Germany (Decision), App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
215. See Huvig v. France (Judgment), App. No. 11105/84, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 35
(1990), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57627.
216. Weber, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 78; see also supra note 10, at 4 and accompanying
text.
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accessibility, foreseeability, and compatibility with the rule of law.217 A
breach of domestic legal requirements, or the absence of sufficient legal reg-
ulation of surveillance, would automatically lead to a violation at the inter-
national level.218
Accessibility is satisfied mainly through the publication of the primary
and secondary legislation regulating surveillance, which achieves trans-
parency and allows the public to familiarize themselves with the relevant
rules. Accessibility does not require the full disclosure of all internal regula-
tions regarding the methods of signals intelligence, if their publication
would enable surveillance to be evaded. But a certain level of accessibility
must be maintained.219
The foreseeability criterion obviously does not require individuals to have
advance notice to that they will be subjected to surveillance, as that would
defeat the whole purpose of the exercise. Rather, the public must be able to
ascertain in what circumstances the authorities have the power to subject
individuals to measures of surveillance.220 In particular, the European Court
“does not consider that there is any ground to apply different principles
concerning the accessibility and clarity of the rules governing the intercep-
tion of individual communications, on the one hand, and more general
programmes of surveillance, on the other.”221 The Human Rights Commit-
tee also cautioned a number of states that their present legal arrangements
on surveillance were insufficiently clear and precise and lacked appropriate
safeguards.222
With regard to compatibility with the rule of law, the key requirement is
that authorities are not granted unfettered discretion in applying surveil-
217. See Liberty, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Malone v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App.
No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para 84 (1984); General Comment No. 16, para. 3 (“Interference
authorized by States can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provi-
sions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.”).
218. See, e.g., Malone, App. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 87 (regarding the collection of teleph-
ony metadata which simply collected in the absence of any legal prohibition, rather than pursuant to an
affirmative legal authority); Weber, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 90.
219. See Shimovolos v. Russia (Judgment), App. No. 30194/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 67–71 (2011);
Liberty,  App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 60–61.
220. Malone, App. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 67 (“In particular, the requirement of foresee-
ability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to
intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly. Nevertheless, the law must
be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which
and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially
dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence.”); see also General
Comment No. 16, para. 8; Van Hulst v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 82d Sess., Commc’n
No. 903/1999, at para. 7.7, UN Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (Nov. 15, 2004). (“[T]he relevant legis-
lation authorizing interference with one’s communications must specify in detail the precise circum-
stances in which such interference may be permitted and that the decision to allow such interference can
only be taken by the authority designated by law, on a case-by-case basis.”).
221. Liberty, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 63.
222. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observationson Jamaica, para. 20, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.83 (Nov. 19, 1997); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Russian
Federation, para. 19, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.54, (July 26, 1995).
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lance measures.223 With regard to telephone tapping in particular, the Euro-
pean Court requires minimum safeguards to be set out in statutory law with
respect to “the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception
order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones
tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be
followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions
to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circum-
stances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes de-
stroyed.”224 Thus, for instance, in Liberty the Court was quite concerned that
the “legal discretion granted to the executive for the physical capture of
external communications was . . . virtually unfettered.”225 Similarly, both
the Human Rights Committee and the European Court have considered in-
dependent, especially judicial, supervision of specific surveillance measures
to be a crucial safeguard for preventing abuse.226
When it comes to arbitrariness/necessity in a democratic society, states
will almost invariably be able to satisfy criterion (3), namely that their sur-
veillance regime pursues a legitimate aim, such as national security, public
safety, or the prevention of crime.227 While Article 8(2) of the ECHR pro-
vides that safeguarding the “economic well-being of the country” is also a
legitimate aim, it remains an open question whether purely economic or
industrial espionage would be considered as legitimate if it involved intru-
sions into the privacy of individuals.
If the formal legality requirements are satisfied, justifiability will turn on
criterion (4), proportionality.228 The proportionality analysis will take into
223. Malone, App. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 68 (“Since the implementation in practice of
measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or
the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the
executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate the scope
of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with suffi-
cient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual
adequate protection against arbitrary interference.”).
224. Weber v. Germany (Decision), App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 95; see also
Iordachi v. Moldova (Judgment), App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91245.
225. Liberty, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 64.
226. See, e.g., Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. v. Netherlands (Judgment), App.
No. 39315/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 89–102 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-114439; Rotaru v. Romania (Judgment), App. No. 28341/95, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
para. 59 , available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58586; U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on The Netherlands, para. 14, UN Doc. CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4 (Aug.
25, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on Sweden, para. 18, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
SWE/CO/6 (April 2, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on  Zimbabwe, para. 25,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.89, (April 6, 1998).
227. See, e.g., Weber, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 103–04.
228. See  Van Hulst v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 82d Sess., 70-71, Commc’n No.
903/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (Nov. 15, 2004); Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Human
Rights Comm., 50th Sess., para. 8.3, Commc’n No. 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Apr.
4, 1994) (“The Committee interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any interference
with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given
case.”); General Comment No. 16, para. 4 (holding that non-arbitrariness requires reasonableness).
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account a number of factors, and incorporates a level of deference to the
state:
The Court reiterates that when balancing the interest of the re-
spondent State in protecting its national security through secret
surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference
with an applicant’s right to respect for his or her private life, it
has consistently recognised that the national authorities enjoy a
fairly wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means for
achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. Nev-
ertheless, in view of the risk that a system of secret surveillance
for the protection of national security may undermine or even de-
stroy democracy under the cloak of defending it, the Court must
be satisfied that there exist adequate and effective guarantees
against abuse. This assessment depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible
measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities
competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the
kind of remedy provided by the national law.229
In Weber and Saravia the European Court conducted such an analysis and
found that the German G 10 Act on surveillance, as amended after a judg-
ment of the Federal Constitutional Court, satisfied both the legality and
proportionality criteria and contained sufficient safeguards to prevent
abuse.230 In Liberty, on the other hand, the Court found that the 1985 ver-
sion of the RIPA did not satisfy the accessibility and foreseeability criteria
since it did not “provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the
scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the State
to intercept and examine external communications. In particular, it did not,
as required by the Court’s case law, set out in a form accessible to the public
any indication of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination,
sharing, storing, and destroying intercepted material.”231 But in Kennedy the
Court found the revised RIPA 2000 to be compliant with Article 8 with
regard to the collection of internal communications, i.e. within the United
Kingdom, pursuant to a specific warrant and with appropriate safeguards.232
C. Outlook
The preceding discussion was admittedly general. It is not my purpose
here to argue that any given surveillance program, as for example is run by
the NSA or GCHQ, is substantively unlawful. Rather, my point is that
there already exists an analytical framework in which their lawfulness can be
229. Weber, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 106.
230. Id. paras. 108–38.
231. Liberty v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 69 (2008).
232. Kennedy v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
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assessed. Hence, while those sceptical about an extraterritorial right to pri-
vacy are correct in saying that the advocates for such a right need to explain
what it would look like and how it would affect foreign espionage activities
that most countries in the world have historically engaged in,233 this does
not mean that we are starting from a blank slate. Nor does this mean that
privacy advocates have to come up with a complete extraterritorial privacy
blueprint, replete with ready-made, fully-fledged solutions for every con-
ceivable problem, especially when new technologies allow for the application
of surveillance measures to vast numbers of ordinary individuals.
Rather, just as in the domestic context, the fleshing out of an extraterrito-
rial right to privacy will happen in an iterative process. Cases will be de-
cided; reports will be filed and debated. Even domestically this process is
not restricted to litigation, but also includes dialogue between the executive
and the legislative branches, and within each branch, under public scrutiny.
Internationally this process involves an even greater multiplicity of actors,
from governments and international organizations to human rights bodies,
NGOs, academics and activists. Indeed, privacy activists already have drawn
up a set of principles to govern extraterritorial surveillance, drawing on the
case law I have just outlined above.234 In developing an extraterritorial right
to privacy we can always draw upon domestic experiences, including those
on data protection,235 and the already rich case law of national and interna-
tional courts and human rights bodies on surveillance and related matters,
be it the judgments of the German Constitutional Court on dragnets236 or
the European Court’s on DNA databases.237
In other words, developing a right to privacy externally is fundamentally
no different from developing it internally, except that the latter project has
had a significant head-start. In doing so, the normative starting point
should be the same. The factors that we consider relevant internally would
also be relevant externally, be it the type of data being collected, the purpose
for which the data will be used, the type and quality of oversight mecha-
nisms, and the clarity and predictability of the legal framework. But while
the starting point would be the same, the end result need not be if the
differences between the internal and external settings so warrant.
Perhaps most importantly, restricting the use of surveillance internally
more than externally can be justified by the state having alternative tools at
233. See Benjamin Wittes, A Global Human Right to Privacy?, Lawfare Blog (Nov. 11, 2013, 5:05
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/a-global-human-right-to-privacy/.
234. See International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, supra
note 8, at 2 (discussing legality, legitimate aim, necessity, adequacy, proportionality, a competent judi-
cial authority, due process, user notification, transparency, public oversight, integrity of communications
and systems, safeguards for international cooperation, and safeguards against illegitimate access).
235. See generally Christopher Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law
(2013).
236. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BvR 518/
02, (Ger.).
237. S. v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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its disposal in the domestic context that enable it to achieve the same ends,
and this is what a proportionality analysis would be able to take into ac-
count. An extraterritorial right to privacy would emphatically not mean the
end of all traditional (and novel) methods of foreign espionage and surveil-
lance, nor a complete elision of all distinctions between internal and external
surveillance. The human rights framework is sufficiently flexible so as to
accommodate legitimate governmental interests, and human rights bodies
have been prepared to extend to states a significant measure of deference in
matters of national security.238
Or, to turn back to our Angela Merkel example, although she would like
anyone be entitled to respect for her human right to privacy, this does not
mean that she could never be lawfully spied upon. This is so not because she
would in the eyes of the interfering state be a foreign citizen, or because her
privacy would intrinsically be less valued, but because she is the head of a
foreign government and the countervailing state interest in knowing what
she is up to would be that much stronger when compared to an ordinary
person.239 Yet, she would still be entitled to some protection—arguably one
could not violate the most intimate areas of her individual autonomy, e.g.
by collecting data about her sex life with the purpose of blackmailing her.240
In sum, while the human rights framework is flexible, it will still have an
impact on the existing surveillance practices, some of which would be re-
garded as unlawful. While governments should not fear reckless human
rights scrutiny, they should also not think that this scrutiny will have no
bite.241 We have seen how the European Court has already dealt with signals
238. In addition to the cases examined above, one of the most comprehensive examples of the defer-
ence given by the European Court to a state is Finogenov v. Russia (Judgment), App. Nos. 18299/03 &
27311/03, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
108231 (dealing with Russia’s use of an anaesthetic gas during the terrorist siege of the Dubrovka theatre
in Moscow, with the Court refusing, for example, to draw inferences from Russia’s failure to supply it
with the formula of the gas used, or to question Russia’s judgment that the use of the gas was appropriate
under the circumstances, despite the many casualties it caused among the hostages).
239. Obviously, governments themselves do not possess human rights. If all a spy did was to steal
official documents or computer files, without collecting the personal data or communications of any
individual, no human rights issue would arise. Thus, if Edward Snowden was working for Russia or some
other states, and all he did was to obtain secret U.S. government documents, he violated applicable U.S.
laws but did not necessarily violate anyone’s right to privacy. This kind of espionage would not be
regulated by international human rights law.
240. Cf. Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Gallagher & Ryan Grim, Top-Secret Document Reveals NSA Spied On
Porn Habits As Part Of Plan To Discredit “Radicalizers”, The Huffington Post (Nov. 26, 2013, 11:20
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html; Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2004, 1 BvR 2378/98, (Ger.) (holding
that the human dignity guarantee in Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law requires that a central core of
a person’s private life is inviolable and absolutely protected, and that invasion thereof cannot be justified
in the public interest).
241. See, e.g., Ira Rubinstein, Greg Nojeim, & Ronald Lee, Systematic Government Access to Personal
Data: A Comparative Analysis, Center for Democracy and Technology (Nov. 13, 2013), https://
cdt.org/files/pdfs/govaccess2013/government-access-to-data-comparative-analysis.pdf (arguing that due
to the pace of technological developments the legislative frameworks of most states do not adequately
regulate extraterritorial surveillance and are not satisfactory from a human rights standpoint).
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intelligence cases, upholding the surveillance programs in some and requir-
ing improvements in others. The intelligence world did not come crashing
down. There is room enough within the human rights framework for both
meaningful privacy protections and effective intelligence work—as well as
for plenty of practices that may well be stupid but are not unlawful.242
Conclusion
The central thesis of this article is that human rights treaties do apply to
all or the vast majority of foreign surveillance activities, including the bulk
collection of the communications and personal data of millions of ordinary
people by the NSA and GCHQ. The appeal of human rights as a regulatory
framework lies precisely in the fact that surveillance measures are now
deployed against masses of ordinary people both at home and abroad, rather
than simply against the agents of foreign governments who could otherwise
be left to their own devices.243 While it is natural for governments and their
intelligence agencies to resist this development, and while some courts and
human rights bodies may be prepared to set arbitrary limits on the extrater-
ritorial application of the right to privacy, this resistance is unwise. Any
proposed limits on extraterritorial application will ultimately prove unstable
and unpersuasive, since they are not supported by any coherent normative
theory as to why a certain group of humans is deserving of protection of
their privacy, while a different one is not. A categorical rejection of extrater-
ritorial application will only serve to undermine states’ arguments on the
substantive lawfulness of their surveillance programs.244 We have already
seen, for instance, how the U.K. government’s strategy of opposing the ap-
plication of the ECHR to its forces in occupied Iraq in the end backfired and
left it exposed on the merits.245
242. See, e.g., James Ball, Xbox Live among Game Services Targeted by US and UK Spy Agencies, The
Guardian (Dec. 9, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-
games-world-warcraft-second-life (reporting on NSA agents deployed to World of Warcraft and other
mass online games to monitor whether in-game communications were being used by terrorists).
243. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches “Into the Past” to
Retrieve, Replay Phone Calls, Wash. Post (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na-
tional-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/
18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html (reporting on an NSA program capable of re-
cording and sifting through all of the phone calls made in an unidentified country over the course of a
month).
244. See also Van Schaack, supra note 84, at 62 (calling on the US to relinquish its “untenable and
ultimately pointless” categorical opposition to the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR).
245. See, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 27021/08, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612 (holding that UN Se-
curity Council resolutions were not clear enough to displace the Article 5 ECHR prohibition on preven-
tive security detention); Smith v. Ministry of Defence, [2013] UKSC 41 (holding that UK soldiers
deployed abroad are protected by the ECHR vis-a`-vis the UK itself); Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Def.,
[2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [2007] QB 140 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/
Civ/2005/1609.html; see also Marko Milanovic, Hassan v. United Kingdom, IHL and IHRL, and Other
News in (Extra-)Territoriality and Shared Responsibility, EJIL: Talk! (Dec. 18, 2013), http://
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Where the real discussion is to be had, therefore, is not on the threshold
question of applicability but on the substance of an extraterritorial right to
privacy. And here opinions will obviously differ, likely less so on the general
principles and more so on the specifics. Some will naturally incline towards
more protection for privacy both internally and externally, while others will
favour the pursuit of national security interests.246 Privacy advocates will, for
example, argue that the content/metadata distinction is meaningless in light
of modern technological developments and should be abandoned, that dis-
tinctions between individuals on the basis of citizenship and immigration
status should equally be abandoned, that bulk collection and mass surveil-
lance are categorically incompatible with the right to privacy as inherently
disproportionate, that judicial supervision is a central safeguard against
abuse, that individuals subjected to surveillance have a right to notified after
the fact, and that states have strong positive obligations to be prevent spy-
ing by third parties and to regulate private actors.247 States with extensive
surveillance programs will push back against all or some of these arguments,
while other states may be more inclined to accept them. But this is a good,
healthy process, since many of these issues are complex and non-obvious.
Human rights law will thus provide a space for contestation at the interna-
tional legal level where these issues can be rationally discussed.
And indeed there will be plenty of space for this debate in the near-to-
medium term. First, there is the follow-up process to the General Assem-
bly’s privacy in the digital age resolution, which will consist inter alia of the
report to be prepared by Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, for the next session of the Assembly. That report will be
influenced by meetings with stakeholders and experts, and depending on the
political situation the Assembly and the Human Rights Council will take
further action. Second, the human rights implications of foreign surveillance
will be on the agenda of national parliaments248 and other deliberative
bodies.249
www.ejiltalk.org/hassan-v-united-kingdom-ihl-and-ihrl-and-other-news-in-extra-territoriality-and-
shared-responsibility/ (discussing the pending Hassan case, which raises the issue of whether human
rights treaties can be derogated from in extraterritorial situations, something that the UK did not do
with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to be able to deny that the ECHR applied altogether).
246. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 84, at 29 (arguing that U.S. surveillance programs are broadly
consistent with Article 17 ICCPR).
247. See, e.g., Eyes Wide Open, Special Report, Privacy Int’l (Nov. 26, 2013), https://
www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/eyes_wide_open_v1.pdf.
248. See, e.g., Jemima Stratford QC & Tim Johnston, Advice in the Matter of State Surveillance, Brick
Court Chambers (2014), available at http://www.brickcourt.co.uk/news-attachments/
APPG_Final_%282%29.pdf (concluding that bulk surveillance by GCHQ is contrary to Article 8
ECHR).
249. See, e.g., Rapporteur of the Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, Draft Report on
the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Parl. Eur. Doc. 2013/2188(INI) (2014), available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=
PE526.085.
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Third, the issue will also be on the agenda during the periodic review of
state reports by the Human Rights Committee and perhaps by other treaty
bodies. The consideration of the U.S. fourth periodic report already took
place in March 2014, with the Committee expressing serious concerns about
the NSA’s surveillance programs, noting in particular that the United States
should
take all necessary measures to ensure that its surveillance activi-
ties, both within and outside the United States, conform to its obliga-
tions under the Covenant, including article 17; in particular,
measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the
right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, propor-
tionality and necessity regardless of the nationality or location of indi-
viduals whose communications are under direct surveillance.250
The Committee here undoubtedly endorsed the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Covenant to foreign surveillance, albeit without explaining under
exactly what theory the Covenant would do so. The Committee here also
pointed out the normative irrelevance of nationality to the protection of
privacy, as I have argued above.
Fourth, foreign surveillance will invariably also be on the radar of univer-
sal periodic review before the Human Rights Council, as well as the Coun-
cil’s special procedures. Establishing a special rapporteur on privacy would
probably be helpful, but would also run against many states’ concerns,
budgetary and otherwise, about the proliferation of special procedures. Fi-
nally, and perhaps of greatest interest to lawyers, there is the pending and
future litigation brought by individuals and NGOs challenging surveillance
measures before both domestic and international courts. And while conten-
tious inter-state cases are possible but politically unlikely, it is not unthink-
able that the follow-up process to the General Assembly’s resolution could
produce a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the threshold
questions of applicability or on the substantive principles of the human
right to privacy in the digital age.
Postscript
This postscript addresses some important developments, from the final-
ization of the substantive text of this article in March 2014, up to the end of
October 2014. Most importantly, as requested by the General Assembly,251
and after having conducted an extensive consultation with various stake-
250. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 109, at 9 (emphasis added).
251. Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, G.A. Res. 68/167, para. 5, UN Doc. A/
RES/68/167, (Jan. 21, 2014).
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holders,252 the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights pro-
duced a report on privacy in the digital age in July 2014. The OHCHR
Report was submitted to the General Assembly and the Human Rights
Council,253 and it is an important and thoughtful contribution to the de-
bates on extraterritorial surveillance. While it is very much pro-privacy ori-
ented, the Report acknowledges the legitimate national security interests of
states and does not put privacy on a pedestal of human rights
fundamentalism.
The Report correctly finds that interferences with the privacy of elec-
tronic communication cannot be justified by reference to some supposedly
voluntary surrender of privacy on the Internet by individual users;254 that
the collection of communications metadata can be just as intrusive as the
collection of the content of the communication;255 and that because of the
chilling effect of surveillance: “[t]he very existence of a mass surveillance
programme thus creates an interference with privacy.”256 The Report hence
adopts a broad understanding of what would constitute an interference with
privacy that is in line with existing international case law and the arguments
developed in this article.
That privacy is interfered with does not mean that that it has been vio-
lated. The Report interprets the text of Article 17 of the ICCPR, under
which interferences with privacy can only be justified if they are not arbi-
trary and unlawful, and in doing so it adopts the general analytical frame-
work of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Indeed, it approvingly cites
the principles on surveillance and human rights adopted by a number of
important NGOs.257
While accepting that national security is a legitimate interest for justify-
ing interferences with privacy, the Report notes that the  “degree of inter-
ference must, however, be assessed against the necessity of the measure to
achieve that aim and the actual benefit it yields towards such a purpose,”258
and concludes that mass surveillance programs are especially problematic on
proportionality grounds:
Where there is a legitimate aim and appropriate safeguards are in
place, a State might be allowed to engage in quite intrusive sur-
veillance; however, the onus is on the Government to demonstrate
that interference is both necessary and proportionate to the spe-
cific risk being addressed. Mass or “bulk” surveillance program-
252. Contributions available on the OHCHR website at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/
Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx.
253. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the
OHCHR, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37, (June 30, 2014) (hereinafter OHCHR Report).
254. Id. para. 18.
255. Id. para. 19.
256. Id. para. 20.
257. Id. paras. 21–23, fn. 14.
258. Id. para. 24.
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mes may thus be deemed to be arbitrary, even if they serve a
legitimate aim and have been adopted on the basis of an accessible
legal regime. In other words, it will not be enough that the mea-
sures are targeted to find certain needles in a haystack; the proper
measure is the impact of the measures on the haystack, relative to
the harm threatened; namely, whether the measure is necessary
and proportionate.259
This assessment, although hedged somewhat (“may be deemed to be arbi-
trary,” not “are arbitrary”(emphasis added)), is still perhaps overly em-
phatic. It is non-obvious that any kind of bulk collection is inherently
disproportionate. If, for example, the U.S. government had reliable intelli-
gence that a terrorist attack was being prepared in New York City in some
specific period, and decided to collect communications metadata in bulk in
order to thwart this attack while that specific threat persisted, I at least
would not find such a measure to be ipso facto disproportionate. It is not
necessarily bulk collection as such, but the vast scale, magnitude, and rela-
tive permanence of certain mass surveillance programs that warrant serious
proportionality concerns.
The Report is similarly skeptical of mandatory third-party data retention
policies,260 and finds that intelligence and data-sharing arrangements may
violate the right to privacy without appropriate safeguards, while wisely
refraining from exploring in detail the complex and unclear framework of
state responsibility regarding compound wrongful acts involving multiple
actors.261 The Report puts much emphasis on the accessibility of the domestic
legal framework: “secret rules and secret interpretations—even secret judi-
cial interpretations—of law do not have the necessary qualities of ‘law’.
Neither do laws or rules that give the executive authorities, such as security
and intelligence services, excessive discretion; the scope and manner of exer-
cise of authoritative discretion granted must be indicated (in the law itself,
or in binding, published guidelines) with reasonable clarity.”262
With regard to extraterritoriality problem, which was the main focus of
my article, the Report takes a very expansive approach:
It follows that digital surveillance therefore may engage a State’s
human rights obligations if that surveillance involves the State’s
exercise of power or effective control in relation to digital commu-
nications infrastructure, wherever found, for example, through di-
rect tapping or penetration of that infrastructure. Equally, where
the State exercises regulatory jurisdiction over a third party that
physically controls the data, that State also would have obliga-
259. Id. para. 25.
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tions under the Covenant. If a country seeks to assert jurisdiction
over the data of private companies as a result of the incorporation
of those companies in that country, then human rights protections
must be extended to those whose privacy is being interfered with,
whether in the country of incorporation or beyond. This holds
whether or not such an exercise of jurisdiction is lawful in the first
place, or in fact violates another State’s sovereignty.263
While it is good that the Report takes an expansive approach to extrater-
ritoriality, with an emphasis on the fact of jurisdiction (rather than the law-
fulness of its exercise), the concept of power and control over
communications infrastructure does not fit well with the existing case law
(which, as we have seen, looks at either control over territory or control over
individuals). Nor does it seem adequate for those types of surveillance that
require no control over the infrastructure at all (for example, directly hack-
ing Angela Merkel’s phone, or subjecting her to audio-visual monitoring).
But while I submit that my proposed model which relies on the distinction
between positive and negative obligations is best suited to deal with the
extraterritoriality problem, the Report’s approach is still a step in the right
direction.
The Report similarly strongly criticizes nationality-based distinctions in
domestic legislation regulating surveillance,264 and addresses the importance
of the involvement of private actors (especially businesses) in governmental
surveillance.265 The Report concludes with a number of recommenda-
tions,266 the most important of which is that:
As an immediate measure, States should review their own national
laws, policies and practices to ensure full conformity with interna-
tional human rights law. Where there are shortcomings, States
should take steps to address them, including through the adop-
tion of a clear, precise, accessible, comprehensive and non-dis-
criminatory legislative framework. Steps should be taken to
ensure that effective and independent oversight regimes and prac-
tices are in place, with attention to the right of victims to an
effective remedy.267
The OHCHR Report will be an important reference point in the discus-
sions to follow. Indeed, at its 27th regular session in September 2014, the
Human Rights Council held a panel discussion on the right to privacy in
the digital age, which I had the privilege of moderating. The discussion
consisted of an interactive exchange of views between four eminent ex-
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perts268 and the representatives of states and other stakeholders.269 There was
broad endorsement, from states as well as from the panelists, of the OHCHR
Report, with some disagreement on specific issues. The comments from the
floor were substantively quite varied, but two big themes were the applica-
tion of the ICCPR to extraterritorial surveillance, and the quantity and qual-
ity of oversight and accountability mechanisms. The panelists and NGOs
also called for the establishment of a new special rapporteur on the right to
privacy.
As I am writing this postscript, the right to privacy in the digital age is
back on the agenda of the General Assembly at its 69th regular session. A
new draft resolution is being negotiated in the Assembly’s Third Commit-
tee, and it may well call on the Human Rights Council to establish a special
mandate on privacy.
268. Catalina Botero, the special rapporteur on the freedom of expression in the Inter-American sys-
tem; Sarah Cleveland, professor at Columbia Law School; Yves Nissim, deputy chief of corporate social
responsibility at Orange Telecom; and Carly Nyst, legal director of Privacy International.
269. The video of the panel discussion is available at http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/watch/
panel-discussion-on-the-right-to-privacy-10th-meeting-27th-regular-session-of-human-rights-council/
3781559740001, while a press release summarizing some of the statements is available at http://www.
ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15017&LangID=E. OHCHR will be pro-
ducing a more detailed report on the discussion in due course.
